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For much of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the nondelegation 
doctrine served as a robust check on governmental expansion. Then, during the New 
Deal revolution, the Supreme Court reined in the doctrine, thereby paving the way 
for the rise of the modern administrative state. This story is one we all know well. It 
is taught in every constitutional law class and has been endorsed by constitutional 
law scholars since the 1930s. In this Article, we are the first to challenge this narrative. 
Our investigation draws upon an original dataset we compiled that includes every 
federal and state nondelegation challenge before 1940—more than two thousand cases 
in total. In reviewing these judicial decisions, we find that the nondelegation doctrine 
never actually constrained expansive delegations of power. Ultimately, our analysis 
reveals that the traditional narrative behind the nondelegation doctrine is nothing 
more than a myth. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Nondelegation doctrine cases follow a predictable pattern. Every few 
years, a court of appeals invokes the doctrine to strike down a federal statute.1 
The Supreme Court inevitably grants certiorari and overturns the appellate 
decision, holding that the statute is a constitutional delegation of legislative 
authority.2 Without fail, the Supreme Court ruling sparks a heated debate 
among constitutional law scholars. Some support the decision—praising the 
Court for driving another nail into the coffin of the nondelegation doctrine.3 
Others oppose the decision—lamenting the Court’s failure to revive the 
doctrine and use it to rein in the ever-expanding administrative state.4 
Despite their intense disagreement over what role the nondelegation 
doctrine ought to play in today’s legal system, both groups of scholars agree 
on the role that the doctrine has played throughout U.S. history. Specifically, 
they all endorse the narrative that, during the nineteenth and early 
twentienth centuries, the nondelegation doctrine served as a meaningful 
check on the unbridled expansion of the administrative state.5 Then, during 
the New Deal, the Supreme Court dismantled the doctrine and paved the 
way for Congress to delegate away any powers it deemed appropriate.6 
 
1 See, e.g., Ass’n of Am. R.Rs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 721 F.3d 666, 677 (D.C. Cir. 2013) 
(holding that the Passenger Railroad Investment and Improvement Act of 2008 unconstitutionally 
“delegate[d] regulatory authority” to Amtrak); Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1038 
(D.C. Cir. 1999) (finding that the EPA relied on a construction of the Clean Air Act in promulgating 
[air quality standards] that “involve[d] an unconstitutional delegation of [legislative] power”). 
2 See, e.g., Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1233-34 (2015) (overturning 
the D.C. Circuit’s decision regarding the unconstitutionality of the Passenger Railroad Investment 
and Improvement Act of 2008’s delegation of authority); Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 
457, 474 (2001) (finding that “[t]he scope of discretion [the Clean Air Act provision in question] 
allows is in fact well within the outer limits of our nondelegation precedents”). 
3 See Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 494 (1987) 
(arguing that “[a] general revival of the nondelegation doctrine would also be a mistake in light of a 
range of considerations,” including the reasonableness of delegation and the difficulty judges would 
have in managing a nondelegation principle). 
4 See Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 8-17, 63-67 
(1982) (tracing the roots of the delegation principle and arguing for a “renewed nondelegation doctrine”); 
Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 335-43 (2002) (defending the 
nondelegation doctrine on originalist grounds); David Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the 
Court Give It Substance?, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1223, 1249-74 (1985) (proposing an improved test for 
determining what congressional delegations of power are improper). 
5 See Sunstein, supra note 3, at 447 (noting the opposition of the courts to “statutes creating 
agencies” on nondelegation grounds during the early New Deal era); see also Aranson et al., supra 
note 4, at 8-17 (describing the traditional nondelegation narrative of the Supreme Court using the 
doctrine to prevent the expansion of federal New Deal programs). 
6 See Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1237-41 (1994) 
(arguing that the Supreme Court has abandoned the nondelegation doctrine as a tool to hold legislation 
unconstitutional); Sunstein, supra note 3, at 447-48, 482 (noting “the downfall of the nondelegation doctrine” 
when the Court ended its assault on New Deal reforms and began tolerating broad delegations of authority). 
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In this Article, we argue that this narrative is wrong. Drawing from our 
own dataset of more than two thousand nondelegation cases, we show that 
there was never a time in which the courts used the nondelegation doctrine 
to limit legislative delegations of power. In short, we expose the myth of the 
nondelegation doctrine. Before presenting these findings, we briefly situate 
the nondelegation doctrine in the context of the New Deal to illustrate why 
our analysis represents such an important and dramatic departure from 
accepted wisdom. 
As scholars have long maintained, the New Deal transformed the 
landscape of American constitutional law. The constitutional scholar Edward 
Corwin characterized the U.S. Supreme Court’s capitulation to the Franklin 
D. Roosevelt Administration as a “constitutional revolution.”7 Historian 
William Leuchtenberg saw the Supreme Court—and the Constitution—as 
“reborn” following the 1937 “switch in time.”8 Constitutional theorist Bruce 
Ackerman characterized the New Deal as a moment of transformation that 
marked the transition to an entirely new constitutional regime.9 And political 
scientist Howard Gillman concluded that the Constitution, as well-trained 
lawyers understood it, was “besieged” and eventually “collapsed” in the 1930s.10 
Part of what distinguishes the New Deal from other episodes of 
constitutional change is the breadth and depth of the reevaluation of 
established constitutional doctrine. Most famously, the bonds of “substantive 
due process” and expansive constitutional protections for property rights 
were cast off in favor of a regime of “preferred freedoms.”11 The economic 
 
7 See EDWARD S. CORWIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, LTD. 112-14 (Am. Offset Printers 
rev. ed. 1946) (1941) [hereinafter CORWIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION] (arguing that the 
Court’s decisions upholding New Deal legislation greatly weakened the power of judicial review to 
check “national legislative power”). 
8 See WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 233, 235 (1995) (noting the consensus among historians 
that the year 1937 marked the beginning of a new era in the Supreme Court’s constitutional 
jurisprudence and “altered fundamentally the character of the Court’s business, the nature of its 
decisions, and the alignment of its friends and foes”). 
9 See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 114-15 (1991) (describing the 
Court’s shift during the New Deal as “a transformative [constitutional] amendment expressing a 
profound, but not total, change in American constitutional identity”). 
10 See HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF 
LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 201 (1993) (“The ‘constitutional revolution of 1937’ 
marked the moment when the Founders’ conception of a faction-free American Republic collapsed . . . .”). 
11 See G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 198-99 (2000) 
(describing the traditional account of the Supreme Court’s retreat in political economy cases 
involving the Commerce, Due Process, and Contract Clauses); Howard Gillman, Preferred Freedoms: 
The Progressive Expansion of State Power and the Rise of Modern Civil Liberties Jurisprudence, 47 POL. 
RES. Q. 623, 625 (1994) (arguing that as the courts relaxed restrictions on the legislative power to 
regulate the economy, they enshrined individual liberties as “preferred freedoms” that would receive 
special judicial protection). 
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rights jurisprudence of Lochner12 gave way to the individual and political rights 
jurisprudence of Carolene Products.13 At the same time, the constitutional rules of 
federalism were thoroughly reevaluated to empower the national government 
to take more action to guide social and economic development within the 
nation.14 The scope of federal regulatory power was dramatically expanded,15 
while federal budgetary authority was given new significance.16 
Another key component of the New Deal constitutional revolution was 
the alteration of the separation of powers and the expansion of presidential 
power. In particular, the Court significantly reworked the nondelegation doctrine 
in order to allow the assignment of substantial discretion over regulatory 
policy to executive branch officials.17 Reviled by some, the Court’s new 
approach to the delegation of legislative power underscored its reassessment 
of the judicial role within the constitutional system that was visible in other 
areas of constitutional law.18 Henceforth, the federal judiciary was to take a 
hands-off approach to assessing the congressional assignment of policy 
responsibility to other government officials. 
In the view of some critics, the Court transformed the constitutional 
scheme into a system of executive governance. As Judge Douglas Ginsburg 
famously put the issue, 
[F]or 60 years the nondelegation doctrine has existed only as part of the 
Constitution-in-exile . . . . The memory of these ancient exiles, banished for 
standing in opposition to unlimited government, is kept alive by a few 
 
12 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
13 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
14 See ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 121 (“For the New Deal Justices, it was clear that the 1930’s 
had swept away the old law of economic relations . . . .”). 
15 See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124-25 (1942) (interpreting the Commerce Clause 
to permit the federal government’s regulation of wheat grown for home consumption because the 
wheat could have a “substantial economic effect on interstate commerce”); United States v. Darby, 
312 U.S. 100, 114-15 (1941) (holding that the Commerce Clause grants Congress the power to regulate 
employment conditions); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 36-38 (1937) (finding 
that the Commerce Clause grants Congress the power to regulate intrastate labor relations if they 
have a “close and substantial relation to interstate commerce”). 
16 See, e.g., Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640-41 (1937) (finding that the Social Security 
program is a valid exercise of Congress’s spending power and is not unconstitutional under the Tenth 
Amendment); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 589-91 (1937) (upholding the unemployment 
compensation provisions of the Social Security Act of 1935 as a valid use of the taxing power). 
17 See Sunstein, supra note 3, 447-48 (noting that the “disintegrat[ion]” of challenges to 
executive agencies on nondelegation grounds led to a “working compromise in which broad 
delegations of power [to the executive branch] were tolerated”). 
18 See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
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scholars who labor on in the hope of a restoration, a second coming of the 
Constitution of liberty . . . .19 
We argue that this familiar narrative is mistaken. There was no golden age 
in which the courts enforced a robust nondelegation doctrine that compelled 
legislators to make hard policy choices. The prevalent vision of the pre–New 
Deal nondelegation doctrine is a myth. Although the New Deal Court revised 
the formula for assessing whether Congress had improperly delegated 
legislative power to others, the change was more formal than real. The federal 
courts never posed a significant obstacle to the development of the 
administrative state and the delegation of extensive policymaking authority 
to executive officials. When it comes to the nondelegation doctrine, there is 
much less to the constitutional revolution of 1937 than is commonly thought.  
To appreciate the scope of the traditional nondelegation doctrine, one 
must cast a wide net. Even though the idea of the nondelegation doctrine was 
well established in pre–New Deal law and constitutional thought, the U.S. 
Supreme Court heard relatively few nondelegation cases prior to the New 
Deal. The real work of developing and applying nondelegation principles 
over the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was done by 
the state and lower federal courts. As a consequence, the pre–New Deal tradition 
of nondelegation jurisprudence has largely been left in obscurity. This Article 
seeks to recover that tradition and examine its contours. In doing so, it reveals 
that the constitutional limitation on the delegation of legislative power was 
frequently observed in theory but rarely enforced in practice. When it comes 
to the nondelegation doctrine, there is no “lost constitution” to recover. 
Our purpose in this Article is not to engage in the normative debate over 
whether the courts ought to enforce the nondelegation doctrine. Instead, our 
goal is descriptive in nature. We set out to uncover how the courts invoked 
the nondelegation doctrine in the period from the nation’s Founding through 
the New Deal. In order to accomplish this task, we compiled an original 
dataset of every federal and state case that involved a nondelegation challenge 
between 1789 and 1940. 
In Part I, we detail the conventional narrative surrounding the nondelegation 
doctrine. This narrative maintains that the doctrine was—throughout the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—a restrictive limitation on legislative 
delegations but that it was ultimately cast into exile by the time of the New 
Deal constitutional revolution. In Part II, we examine how developments in 
three different areas have influenced the course of the nondelegation 
 
19 Douglas H. Ginsburg, Delegation Running Riot, 1 REGULATION 83, 84 (1995) (reviewing DAVID 
SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE 
THROUGH DELEGATION (1993)). 
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doctrine. First, we explain the theoretical underpinnings of nondelegation 
constitutional principles and why they were thought to be central to American 
constitutionalism. Second, we examine the development of the nondelegation 
doctrine and its application by the U.S. Supreme Court, observing the Court’s 
repeated willingness to uphold congressional delegation of policymaking 
authority. Third, we turn to the states and the lower federal courts and identify 
a similar pattern of strong judicial statements about the importance of the 
nondelegation principle coupled with weak judicial enforcement of the doctrine. 
Finally, in Part III, we present empirical data on state and federal courts’ use 
of the nondelegation doctrine from the Founding through the New Deal. 
I. THE “CONSTITUTION IN EXILE” 
It is generally believed that the classical Constitution of the nineteenth 
century included a nondelegation doctrine with real teeth, which was 
subsequently defanged as part of the struggle over the New Deal. The 
assertion and eventual abandonment of nondelegation principles are part of 
the conventional historical account of the constitutional transformation of the 
New Deal period. The tantalizing possibility that a robust nondelegation 
jurisprudence was “lost” in the New Deal revolution but could be recovered in 
the modern era to help constrain or dismantle the modern administrative 
state has been a recurring feature of libertarian constitutional thought since the 
Reagan era.20 In this Part, we recall those constitutional stories. Subsequent 
Parts will show that these stories are little more than myths. 
The significance of the nondelegation doctrine for the New Deal debates 
rests on the importance of the U.S. Supreme Court’s actions in Panama 
Refining Co. v. Ryan21 and A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States.22 In 
Panama Refining Co., the Court struck down a provision of the National 
Industrial Recovery Act.23 Under the authority of that statute, the Roosevelt 
Administration had issued a code of “[f]air [c]ompetition” for the petroleum 
industry and began the process of setting production quotas for individual oil 
producers.24 Chief Justice Hughes objected that “Congress has declared no 
policy, has established no standard, has laid down no rule,” but merely 
delegated its lawmaking function to executive officials.25 
 
20 E.g., Lawson, supra note 6. 
21 293 U.S. 388 (1935). 
22 295 U.S. 495 (1935). Chief Justice Hughes also thought the Bituminous Coal Conservation 
Act of 1935 relied on a theory that would “remove all restrictions upon the delegation of legislative 
power.” Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 318 (1936) (Hughes, C.J., concurring). 
23 293 U.S. at 414-15, 433. 
24 Id. at 408-10. 
25 Id. at 430. 
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In Schechter, the Court struck down a different provision of the same 
statute under which the Administration had created a “Live Poultry Code” to 
regulate the activities of those raising, buying, selling, and slaughtering 
chickens.26 Even Justice Cardozo was moved to declare that “[t]his is 
delegation running riot.”27 The Court’s emphasis on the idea that there must 
be some constitutional limits to how much policymaking authority could be 
delegated to the executive branch cast doubt upon the entire New Deal project.28 
It was an idea that Assistant Attorney General Robert H. Jackson singled out 
as “purely judge-made, not Constitution-made.”29 Presumably, nondelegation 
was among those doctrines that a more “liberal-minded Judiciary” could 
expect to abandon without the need for a formal constitutional amendment.30 
The demise of the nondelegation doctrine in the New Deal revolution is 
less famous than the contemporaneous doctrinal shifts in the interpretation 
of constitutional rights and federalism. No doubt the reconfiguration of the 
separation of powers is less prominent in part because the nondelegation 
doctrine had played a much smaller role in the long progressive lead-up to 
the final conflicts of the New Deal than had debates over substantive due 
process31 or interstate commerce.32 Moreover, the New Deal Court did not 
similarly repudiate the earlier nondelegation doctrine as it did in other areas 
of the law, and the turnaround on the nondelegation doctrine was neither as 
abrupt nor as dramatic. The constitutional revolution of 1937, contained 
snugly in volume 301 of the United States Reports, did not include a seminal 
case on the delegation of legislative powers. The reformation of the separation 
of powers came about somewhat more gradually and was not accompanied by 
sharp dissents lamenting the loss of ancient constitutional verities. 
 
26 295 U.S. at 521-24. 
27 Id. (Cardozo, J., concurring). 
28 See, e.g., Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Administrative State and the Original Understanding: Comments 
on Eskridge and Ferejohn, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 197, 200 (1992) (noting that “various New Deal and 
post–New Deal regulatory statutes . . . would potentially run afoul of a serious nondelegation doctrine”). 
29 CARL BRENT SWISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 910 (1943); see also 
Patrick W. Duff & Horace E. Whiteside, Delegata Potestas Non Potest Delegari: A Maxim of American 
Constitutional Law, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 168, 195-96 (1929) (“Far from being a principle of constitutional 
law, it seems that our maxim has little, if any, application to the distribution of the work of government 
by the legislature. . . . The whole doctrine, insofar as it is asserted to be a principle of constitutional 
law, is built upon the thinnest of implication, or is the product of the unwritten super-constitution.”). 
30 See President Franklin D. Roosevelt, A “Fireside Chat” Discussing the Plan for Reorganization 
of the Judiciary (Mar. 9, 1937) (announcing his plan to add additional Justices to the Supreme Court 
and thus make it more friendly to his New Deal proposals), in THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES 
OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, 122, 133 (Samuel I. Roseman ed., 1941). 
31 See GILLMAN, supra note 10, at 2-5 (summarizing the body of scholarly work addressing the 
Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence in the Lochner era). 
32 See BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A 
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 139 (1998) (noting that the New Deal Commerce Clause cases 
“have been central to the ‘switch in time’ narrative”). 
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Nonetheless, contemporaries understood that the demise of the nondelegation 
doctrine was part and parcel of the reconstruction of the constitutional order 
that was wrought by the New Deal.33 Constitutional scholar and Roosevelt 
advisor Edward Corwin observed at the time that the “great structural principle 
of American constitutional government . . . supplied by the doctrine of the 
Separation of Powers” had been significantly revised “at the hands of the New 
Deal.”34 The Justices were simply coming to grips with a basic truth: “[T]hat 
the practice of delegated legislation is inevitably and inextricably involved 
with the whole idea of governmental intervention in the economic field.”35 
“[I]n other words, governmental interventionism signifies the minimization 
of the principle of the Separation of Powers as a barrier preventing the fusion 
of presidential and congressional power.”36 
Robert Cushman noted that when it came to the nondelegation doctrine, 
the Court seemed to prefer “eating its constitutional cake and having it too” 
by simultaneously upholding delegations of legislative power as “vitally 
necessary to the administration of government” and asserting that “legislative 
powers cannot be delegated.”37 The student editors of the Cornell Law 
Quarterly observed that though the courts “still pay lip service to the doctrine 
of the non-delegability of legislative powers, expansion of the operations of 
government has been accompanied by expansion of the limits of permissible 
delegation of legislative power to administrative bodies.”38 Reviewing 
legislative and judicial developments of the 1930s, one commentator thought 
the record “raise[s] the question as to whether the doctrine that delegated 
powers may not be redelegated has any significance in modern constitutional 
law.”39 The question thus raised could only be regarded as rhetorical. “[T]he 
maxim is no longer even substantially accurate.”40 
 
33 An alternative narrative offered by some New Dealers is that the Court in Roosevelt’s first 
term had departed from established precedents and inappropriately imposed a new nondelegation 
requirement on Congress. See, e.g., EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 
1787–1984, 147 (Randall W. Bland et al. eds., 5th rev. ed. 1984) [hereinafter CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT] 
(summarizing pre–New Deal legislative delegation cases and arguing that “[i]n short, Congress may 
delegate its powers when it is necessary to do so in order to achieve the results it desires”). Others suggested 
that the industrial codes struck down by the Court were unique—and uniquely problematic—in 
involving the delegation of “governmental authority to private individuals.” Hugh Evander Willis, 
Constitution Making by the Supreme Court Since March 29, 1937, 15 IND. L.J. 179, 182 (1940). 
34 CORWIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, supra note 7, at 102. 
35 Id. at 104. 
36 Id. at 105. As Corwin later observed, the nondelegation doctrine had “been subsequently 
relegated by the Court to its increasingly crowded cabinet of juridical curiosities.” CORWIN, THE 
PRESIDENT, supra note 33, at 149. 
37 Robert E. Cushman, The Constitutional Status of the Independent Regulatory Commissions, 24 
CORNELL L.Q. 13, 27 (1938). 
38 Jack L. Ratzkin, Notes and Comments, 26 CORNELL L.Q. 699, 699 (1941). 
39 Charles B. Nutting, Congressional Delegations Since the Schechter Case, 14 MISS. L.J. 350, 367 (1942). 
40 Id. 
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Subsequent accounts of the New Deal constitutional revolution routinely 
take notice of the collapse of the nondelegation doctrine.41 During World War 
II, historian Benjamin Wright cautioned that because the Court had not 
formally overruled its early nondelegation cases, those principles remained a 
“shotgun-behind-the-door” that should temper congressional enthusiasm for 
excessive delegation.42 But after a few more years of experience under the 
New Deal regime, administrative law expert Kenneth Culp Davis advised 
lawyers simply that they would “do more harm than good to their clients’ 
interests” by appealing to the nondelegation doctrine in litigation; “[u]nrealistic 
verbiage in some of the older judicial opinions should not now be taken 
seriously.”43 Justice Thurgood Marshall declared that the nondelegation doctrine 
“is surely as moribund as the substantive due process approach of the same 
era—for which the Court is fond of writing an obituary . . . if not more so.”44 
In recent decades, many conservative scholars and lawyers have called for 
a revival of the nondelegation doctrine that they see as having been cast aside 
in the constitutional revolution of the early twentieth century.45 Justice 
William Rehnquist took the lead, contending that the nondelegation cases of 
the 1930s “suffer from none of the excesses of judicial policymaking that 
plagued some of the other decisions of that era.”46 He chided his brethren, 
“We ought not to shy away from our judicial duty to invalidate unconstitutional 
delegations of legislative authority solely out of concern that we should thereby 
reinvigorate discredited constitutional doctrines of the pre–New Deal era.”47 
 
41 See, e.g., SWISHER, supra note 29, at 964 (observing that whether due to better statutory 
drafting or “changes in the personnel of the Court,” no statutes were struck down on nondelegation 
grounds after 1937); see also WHITE, supra note 11, at 126 (portraying judicial resistance to executive 
agencies as part of what had to be overcome in the New Deal). 
42 BENJAMIN F. WRIGHT, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 220 (1942). 
43 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND GOVERNMENT 55 (1960). 
44 Nat’l Cable Television Ass’n v. United States, 415 U.S. 352, 353 (1974). 
45 See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 6, at 1240-41 (arguing that the modern administrative state is 
composed of “utterly vacuous statutes” that should be “easy kills under any plausible interpretation 
of the Constitution’s nondelegation principle”). The suggestion has led others in turn to raise cries 
that the conservative legal movement invited a return to “Black Monday,” when the Court struck 
down key components of the New Deal. See Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Introduction to Symposium: Bowsher 
v. Synar, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 421, 426 & n.29 (1987) (noting that some conservative Court 
decisions employed a formalist separation-of-powers approach reminiscent of Panama and Schecter); 
see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS ARE 
WRONG FOR AMERICA 204-05 (2005) (“[L]arge-scale judicial revival of the nondelegation doctrine 
would do little to improve the operation of modern government. It might well make things worse, 
possibly much worse.”); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1722 (2002) (“The nondelegation position lacks any foundation in constitutional 
text and structure, in standard originalist sources, or in sound economic and political theory.”). 
46 Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 675 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
47 Id. at 686. 
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President Ronald Reagan’s Department of Justice suggested that the Court’s 
post–New Deal jurisprudence may be inconsistent with “a strict Madisonian 
concept of separation of powers.”48 Former Supreme Court-nominee Judge 
Douglas Ginsburg has admonished the Court for simply being too timid in 
the face of Congress to enforce a fundamental constitutional principle.49 
Judge Ginsburg put his money where his mouth is in authoring a circuit court 
opinion attempting to revive the nondelegation doctrine.50 As amici, the 
libertarian Cato Institute has complained that the Court since the New Deal has 
“largely abdicated its responsibility” of enforcing the nondelegation doctrine.51 
One Heritage Foundation writer aptly summed up a common view of modern 
conservatives: “[T]he administrative state is a profoundly unconstitutional form 
of government,” in part because of the necessary “delegation of legislative 
power” to executive agencies.52 And, as Gary Lawson complained, “The Supreme 
Court has not invalidated a congressional statute on nondelegation grounds 
since 1935. This has not been for lack of opportunity.”53 
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE 
A. The Constitutional Foundations 
The United States Constitution does not include an explicit provision 
recognizing the principle of separation of powers, but the commitment to 
some form of separation of powers across three branches of government is 
evident throughout the constitutional scheme and various provisions of the 
constitutional text. Article I of the Constitution specifies that “[a]ll legislative 
 
48 OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE YEAR 
2000: CHOICES AHEAD IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 180 (1988). 
49 See Douglas H. Ginsburg & Steven Menashi, Nondelegation and the Unitary Executive, 12 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 251, 264 (2010) (“[T]he judiciary, shrinking before the authority of the democratic 
legislature, has been complicit in allowing delegation to run riot.”). 
50 See Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (finding that the statutory 
language of the Clean Air Act, combined with an existing agency interpretation, constituted an 
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power). While the D.C. Circuit remanded the case for the 
agency to develop more appropriate, binding standards for its decisionmaking process, the case was 
ultimately reversed by Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001). 
51 Brief for The Institute for Justice and The Cato Institute as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents at 11, Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (No. 99-1257). 
52 Joseph Postell, From Administrative State to Constitutional Government, HERITAGE FOUND. 4 
(Dec. 7, 2012), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/12/from-administrative-state-to-const
itutional-government [https://perma.cc/7S7J-YNDD]; see also Joel Hood, Before There Were Mouseholes: 
Resurrecting the Non-Delegation Doctrine, 30 BYU J. PUB. L. 123 (2015) (positing an originalist case 
that the Constitution requires a robust nondelegation doctrine); Lawson, supra note 6, at 1232 
(arguing that “[t]he actual structure and operation of the national government today has virtually 
nothing to do with the Constitution”). 
53 Lawson, supra note 6, at 1240 (footnote omitted). 
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Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States.”54 
Article II and Article III include their own vesting clauses, placing “[t]he 
executive Power” in the hands of the President of the United States55 and 
“[t]he judicial Power of the United States . . . in one supreme Court, and in 
such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and 
establish.”56 The Constitution thus recognizes the existence of distinct functional 
powers that can be characterized as either legislative, executive, or judicial 
and places those powers in hands of different government entities or officials. 
To the extent that the Constitution departs from a pure separation-of-powers 
model and allows some sharing of powers across the branches of government, 
those exceptions are spelled out in the text.57 Whether to introduce some 
checks and balances into the constitutional system or to take advantage of 
some potential governmental efficiencies, the President is, for example, given 
a share of the legislative power through the prerogative of the presidential 
veto.58 Similarly, the Senate is given a share of the executive power through 
the right to advise and consent to the appointment of government officers.59 
The sharing of political power across government branches means that the 
Constitution creates a certain “invitation to struggle” over the control of 
government policy.60 However, the Constitution also provides each branch of 
government a certain core of inalienable power and authority. There is no 
explicit textual prohibition on the delegation of legislative power to other 
actors, but such a rule has long been thought implicit in the U.S. Constitution. 
There are a variety of arguments explaining why a principle of 
nondelegation might be found in these textual provisions and the broader 
structure of the separation of powers. The very idea of a separation of powers 
might suggest that executive officials should refrain from, or be barred from, 
exercising legislative powers.61 Consolidating the legislative and executive 
functions in the same hands has long been seen as a serious threat to liberty, 
and a core principle of liberal constitutional theory was to separate those 
distinct governmental functions in distinct governmental organs. Montesquieu’s 
maxim that “[w]hen the legislative and executive powers are united in the same 
 
54 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
55 Id. art. II, § 1. 
56 Id. art. III, § 1. 
57 For a discussion of the differences between a pure separation-of-powers model and a 
checks-and-balances model of organizing the three branches, see M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM 
AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 13-14 (2d ed. 1998). 
58 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
59 Id. art. II, § 2. 
60 CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, supra note 33, at 201. 
61 Constitutional scholar M.J.C. Vile concluded that it was effectively impossible to reconcile 
the modern administrative state with traditional theories of the separation of powers among three 
distinct branches of government. VILE, supra note 57. 
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person, or in the same body of magistracy, there can be then no liberty”62 
suggested not only that the constitutional Framers must be careful to separate 
the two classes of powers—but also that subsequent government officials must 
be prevented from concentrating the powers that had initially been set apart.63 
Here the separation-of-powers concerns merge with due process concerns. 
Not only judges but average citizens should be able to understand what the rules 
are in order to be able to comply with them in systematic and predictable ways. 
If the command handed down by the legislature is murky, then judges are left to 
their own devices in determining how to apply them and citizens are at risk of 
being governed on an ad hoc basis by individual men rather than by settled law.64 
Worse yet, judges are left with no standard by which to evaluate the actions 
of executive officials. There is little effective difference between the exercise 
of power under an expansive delegation of power and the simple exercise of 
arbitrary discretion. In neither case could a third party, such as a judge, assess 
whether the action taken by a government official was authorized or constrained 
by a preexisting rule. Robert Cushman went so far as to argue, “[T]he doctrine 
of the non-delegability of legislative power could safely be scrapped as long 
as due process of law remains the effective constitutional guarantee it now is.”65 
Due process considerations and nondelegation considerations would generate 
the same set of constitutional principles. 
Somewhat differently, some have argued that the lawmaking function 
should reside specifically in a representative assembly, which suggests that it 
would be inappropriate to transfer that power to a less accountable and less 
representative institution.66 The English political theorist John Locke had 
this in mind in contending that 
the legislative cannot transfer the power of making laws to any other hands; 
for it being but a delegated power from the people, they who have it cannot 
 
62 BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 202 (David Wallace Carrithers ed., 
Thomas Nugent trans., 1977) (1748). 
63 A closely related argument would emphasize due process or rule-of-law principles. 
Combining legislative and executive power risks subjecting individuals to arbitrary or purely 
discretionary power rather than to regularized and known rules. See, e.g., Cushman, supra note 37, at 
23-24 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s due process is a “flexibile and practicable doctrine” to 
respond to regulation that attempts to fuse power across the three branches). 
64 Delegation can thus be understood as at odds with the Benthamite desire for legislative 
codification and for legal transparency that had once accompanied the rise of legislatures as 
significant policymaking bodies. See, e.g., CECIL T. CARR, DELEGATED LEGISLATION 1 (1921) 
(“The action of our Acts of Parliament grows more and more dependent upon subsidiary legislation. 
More than half our modern Acts are to this extent incomplete statements of law.”). 
65 Cushman, supra note 37, at 33. 
66 David Schoenbrod makes a related argument, contending that expansive delegation of 
lawmaking authority to administrative agencies simply results in worse public policy. DAVID 
SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE 
THROUGH DELEGATION 125-31 (1993). 
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pass it over to others. . . . And when the people have said, we will submit to 
rules, and be governed by laws made by such men, and in such forms, nobody 
else can say other men shall make laws for them; nor can the people be bound 
by any laws but such as are enacted by those whom they have chosen and 
authorized to make laws for them.67 
The late-nineteenth century jurist Thomas Cooley referenced this principle 
when arguing that “[t]his high prerogative has been intrusted to [the legislature’s] 
own wisdom, judgment, and patriotism, and not to those of other persons.”68 
The Lockean postulate that the legislature cannot transfer its lawmaking 
power to another can also be understood in more formalistic terms. Locke pointed 
out that “[t]he people alone can appoint the form of the commonwealth,” and 
thus mere government officials should not be able to alter those forms without 
the consent of the governed.69 The “maxim of the common law[,] [d]elegata 
potestas non potest delegari,” is frequently cited as authority for the general 
point that those who are entrusted with power must exercise the trust 
themselves and not further delegate the power “to a stranger, whose ability 
and integrity might not be known to the principal, or, if known, might not be 
selected by him for such a purpose.”70 Sotirios Barber has characterized this 
as a simple matter of “constitutional supremacy.”71 Once the “constituent act 
of establishing government [is complete . . .] neither the government nor any of 
its parts should change the constitutional arrangement of offices and 
powers.”72 Congress may not “abdicate” the legislative power that was 
entrusted to it alone by the constitutional Framers. 
Of course, there have been many skeptics. Justice Robert Jackson thought 
it “perfectly obvious” that the Constitution and its Framers “contemplated a 
large measure of delegation” and would not have thrown up obstacles to such 
a necessary measure of governance.73 In his influential administrative law 
casebook, Walter Gellhorn complained that the courts had shown a “lack of logic” 
in their nondelegation cases, leading them to repeatedly yield to “necessity” 
 
67 JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 141 (Thomas P. Peardon ed., Liberal 
Arts Press 1952) (1690).  
68 THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 97 (1880). In characterizing the mid-twentieth century American 
state, Theodore Lowi linked a concern with democracy with a concern for the rule of law. See 
THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM 125 (2d ed. 1979) (“A government of statutes without 
standards may produce pluralism, but it is a pluralism of privilege and tight access . . . .”). 
69 LOCKE, supra note 67, § 141. 
70 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY § 13 (1839). 
71 SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE DELEGATION OF CONGRESSIONAL 
POWER 37 (1975). 
72 Id. 
73 ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 92-93 (1941). 
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while continuing to give lip service to an unworkable rule.74 Louis Jaffe declared 
simply that “[d]elegation of ‘lawmaking’ power is the dynamo of modern 
government,” and the legal objection to it is little more than the carping of the 
“holders of economic power.”75 The political scientist John Roche concluded 
that the original conception of the separation of powers established only a 
“fairly simple and matter-of-fact division of the agencies of the national 
government” and posed no bar to the expansive delegation of legislative 
powers to the executive.76 The putative prohibition on delegations of legislative 
power “has been demolished by constitutional logic drawn from John Marshall” 
holding that congressional power was plenary and that any limits on the 
delegation of power should be understood as “political, not constitutional, in 
character.”77 Since the New Deal, the skeptics have been predominant.78 
B. The Doctrine in the Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court periodically grappled with the nondelegation doctrine 
over the course of its history up to and through the New Deal.79 Early in its 
history, the Court recognized the constitutional significance of the principles 
that implied limits on the authority of Congress to delegate its lawmaking 
power to other government officials. The Court was periodically called upon to 
elaborate on those principles, apply them to new contexts, and evaluate new 
legislative innovations in how Congress has sought to set public policy. The 
Court’s own track record prior to the New Deal was one of uniform deference to 
congressional decisions to delegate some rulemaking to others. While the Court 
briefly deployed the same doctrines to veto congressional legislation during the 
New Deal, it quickly retreated to its earlier deferential posture. The Court’s 
own history suggests that the battles of the New Deal should be viewed as an 
idiosyncratic departure from the constitutional norm rather than representative 
of how the Constitution had historically been understood and applied. 
The Court first addressed a challenge to a federal statute as making an 
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power during the Jefferson 
 
74 WALTER GELLHORN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS 175 (1940). 
75 Louis L. Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of Legislative Power: I, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 359, 359 (1947). 
76 John P. Roche, Distribution of Powers, in 3 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL 
SCIENCES 300, 305-07 (David L. Sills ed., 1968). 
77 Id. at 306-07. 
78 See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, Delegation and Democracy: Comments on David Schoenbrod, 20 
CARDOZO L. REV. 775, 778 (1999) (“[W]e may need more delegation to agencies, not less.”). 
79 For a detailed look at the key cases, see generally Andrew J. Ziaja, Hot Oil and Hot Air: The 
Development of the Nondelegation Doctrine Through the New Deal, a History, 1813–1944, 35 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 921 (2008). 
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Administration.80 The Non-Intercourse Act of 1809 replaced the highly 
controversial trade embargo that was designed to prevent the United States 
from becoming entangled in the war between Britain and France by keeping 
American ships at home.81 While the earlier legislation imposed a comprehensive 
trade embargo, the Non-Intercourse Act directed the embargo specifically 
against the warring powers of Britain and France and also authorized the 
President to lift the embargo against either country if he were to recognize 
the neutral commerce rights of the United States.82 The terms of the Act were 
extended by Congress in 1810, while Congress also temporarily suspended the 
implementation of the Act, giving the two European nations a fixed period to 
renounce their wartime policies against American shipping.83 The President 
was charged with the responsibility of announcing whether Britain or France 
had come to terms with the United States.84 Britain did not give in, and the 
terms of the embargo were put into effect.85 Customs officials subsequently 
seized the cargo of the brig Aurora in the port of New Orleans for violating 
the embargo against Great Britain by importing goods from Liverpool.86 
The owner of the cargo brought suit in federal court, arguing (among other 
issues) that the terms of the Non-Intercourse Act of 1810 were unconstitutional.87 
In particular, the owner argued that Congress had impermissibly “transfer[red] 
the legislative power to the President” and gave a presidential proclamation 
“the force of a law.”88 As the lawyer for the Aurora argued: “Whoever heard 
of a conditional penal law . . . ?”89 Unusually, Chief Justice John Marshall did 
not write the opinion of the Court in the case but instead left those duties to 
the Jeffersonian Justice William Johnson.90 Johnson did not bother to examine 
the constitutional question in any detail. He simply observed that the Court 
could “see no sufficient reason, why the legislature should not exercise its 
discretion in reviving the act . . . either expressly or conditionally, as their 
judgment should direct.”91 
Although the nondelegation issue was raised by counsel, the Justices 
themselves did not elaborate any particular principles for evaluating such 
 
80 For a review of the Court’s early cases addressing legislative delegation, see Keith E. 
Whittington, Judicial Review of Congress Before the Civil War, 97 GEO. L.J. 1257, 1291-92 (2009). 
81 Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382, 382-85 (1813). 
82 Id. at 383. 
83 Id. at 383-84. 
84 Id. at 384. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 382. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 386. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 387. 
91 Id. at 388. 
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situations and largely dismissed the framing of the law as one of delegating 
“legislative power to the President.”92 Instead, the Court left the President’s 
statutorily specified role in triggering the trade embargo to the side and 
focused on the legislature’s power to exercise its own discretion to extend the 
embargo conditionally “upon the occurrence of any subsequent combination of 
events.”93 The active agency of the President was downplayed, while the factual 
preconditions for legal action were underscored. Implicitly, the framing of the 
opinion suggested that the President acted simply as a fact-finder, not as a 
lawmaker. The President “revived” the statute only in a mechanical sense of 
making known whether the factual conditions specified by Congress had been 
met. As a result, the Marshall Court gave its approval to the possibility of 
conditional legislation, while saying little on the potential problem of 
excessive delegation of lawmaking power.94 
In the 1820s, the Court considered constitutional challenges to two other 
statutes that required it to address the nondelegation principle more directly. 
The first case was Wayman v. Southard, a case involving two related issues of 
delegation that arose from the compromised quality of the Judiciary Act of 
1789.95 The statute required that “the laws of the several states,” except where 
otherwise provided, “shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common 
law in the courts of the United States.”96 Rather than creating a distinct 
system of federal rules of judicial procedure, Congress preferred that the 
federal courts be in harmony with the states in which they sat. The easiest 
way to do that—especially since state law was constantly evolving—was 
simply to piggyback on judicial procedures that the states had already put in 
place. In effect, Congress had delegated the development of federal civil 
procedure to the states. Moreover, such rules were often going to be developed 
not by legislatures but by judges. 
 
92 Id. at 386. 
93 Id. at 388. 
94 The Court likewise left the nondelegation issues somewhat implicit when resolving a 
constitutional challenge to congressional antipiracy statutes. See United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 
Wheat.) 153 (1820). Daniel Webster argued that Congress itself was obliged to define the crime of 
piracy and could not delegate to the courts the power to define such crimes. See id. at 156-57 (“Congress 
is bound to define it, in terms, and is not at liberty to leave it to be ascertained by judicial 
interpretation.”). Justice Joseph Story responded that piracy was “a term of a known and determinate 
meaning, as by an express enumeration of all the particulars included in that term.” Id. at 159. Judges 
could be understood as interpreting and applying, rather than legislating, when determining what 
acts constituted the crime of piracy. See id. The issue recurs in later cases, with the same result. See, 
e.g., In re Kollock, 165 U.S. 526, 533 (1897) (“The criminal offence is fully and completely defined by 
the act and the designation by the Commissioner of the particular marks and brands to be used was 
a mere matter of detail.”). 
95 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825). 
96 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006)). 
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The attorney before the Court in Wayman emphasized that substantive 
interests were at stake in regulating judicial procedures, such as the remedies 
available on violated contracts.97 He contended that the “power of making 
such regulations is exclusively vested in the legislative department . . . . It is 
the office of the legislator to prescribe the rule, and of the Judge to apply it.”98 
In response, Chief Justice Marshall admitted that Congress could not “delegate 
to the Courts, or to any other tribunals, powers which are strictly and 
exclusively legislative.”99 The question was what powers might not be “strictly 
and exclusively legislative,” such that Congress might choose not to exercise 
them itself.100 Marshall acknowledged that  
[t]he line has not been exactly drawn which separates those important 
subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself, from those 
of less interest, in which a general provision may be made, and power given 
to those who are to act under such general provisions to fill up the details.101 
Marshall was not prepared to engage in the “delicate and difficult inquiry” 
that would be necessary to draw a “precise boundary” between permissible 
and impermissible delegations.102 It was enough to recognize that “the maker 
of the law may commit something to the discretion of the other departments” 
and that this particular delegation was well-considered to advance the national 
interests of the time.103 
Justice Smith Thompson addressed the same issue a few years later in 
Bank of the United States v. Halstead.104 He observed that regulation of the 
judicial process merely related “to the ministerial duty” of court officers and 
“partakes no more of legislative power, than that discretionary authority 
intrusted to every department of the government in a variety of cases.”105 But 
Thompson also seemed to dodge what Justice Marshall characterized as the 
“delicate and difficult” inquiry of drawing lines between appropriate and 
 
97 Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 13-14. 
98 Id. at 14. 
99 Id. at 42-43. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 43. 
102 Id. at 46. 
103 Id. at 45-46. The Marshall Court obscured the difference between delegating judicial procedures 
to federal judges or to state legislatures and judges. The Court later addressed the problem of federal 
delegation to the states more directly when considering a federal statute authorizing state 
legislatures to establish mining regulations on federal lands within their states. It was not, the Court 
stated, “of a legislative character in the highest sense of the term” to establish such regulations but 
merely a “determination of minor matters,” while again observing that the federal statutes in 
question had been in place for many years and substantial reliance interest had been built up around 
their presumed validity. Butte City Water Co. v. Baker, 196 U.S. 119, 126 (1905). 
104 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 51, 61-62 (1825). 
105 Id. 
396 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 165: 379 
inappropriate delegations by leaning on a long history of usage or practice.106 
If “any doubt existed” about the constitutionality of the delegation in such 
cases, “the practical construction heretofore given to it, ought to have great 
weight.”107 According to Justice Thompson, the courts had been operating 
without incident under this system of rules for nearly thirty years and the 
time to ask whether Congress was constitutionally authorized to set up that 
system had passed.108 
The Court had remarkably little to say regarding the delegation of legislative 
power from the late Marshall Court through the remainder of the nineteenth 
century.109 While the Marshall Court largely avoided serious engagement 
with the principles and standards of nondelegation, the Court finally and 
influentially addressed the question directly at the end of the nineteenth 
century. In the Gilded Age, both the federal and state governments began to 
experiment with new regulatory schemes and governmental institutions 
which blurred the traditional boundaries between legislatures, executives, and 
courts.110 But it was not an example of the growing administrative state that 
generated the first significant federal case grappling with the problem of 
excessive legislative delegation. 
Instead, like the earliest nondelegation case, the case of Field v. Clark 
involved the regulation of international trade and presidential participation 
in triggering statutory application.111 The Tariff Act of 1890 authorized the 
President, by proclamation, to trigger a higher duty rate on specified goods 
from individual countries that did not engage in reciprocal free trade with 
the United States.112 As the Marshall Court had done, the Field Court 
observed that “Congress has frequently, from the organization of the 
government to the present time, conferred upon the President powers, with 
 
106 See id. at 62-63. 
107 Id. The Court later articulated a distinct constraint on the ability of Congress to delegate 
legislative powers to the courts: Article III courts could not be tasked to perform duties that were 
not encompassed by the cases and controversies requirement. See Keller v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 
261 U.S. 428, 441-43 (1923) (holding that Congress could not authorize a federal district court to set 
utility rates in the District of Columbia because that would be an exercise of legislative power, not 
judicial power). 
108 Halstead, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 63-64. 
109 The Court briefly recognized, as the state courts had, that it was an appropriate public 
purpose for state legislatures to delegate to railroad corporations the state’s power of eminent 
domain. See, e.g., Queensbury v. Culver, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 83, 90-91 (1873) (upholding a state law 
authorizing towns to issue bonds that helped railroads acquire land); Olcott v. Supervisors, 83 U.S. 
(16 Wall.) 678, 691 (1872) (“[S]uch delegation of power can be justified . . . [if] the property taken 
by these [railroad] companies is taken for the public use.”). 
110 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Regulatory Conflict in the Gilded Age: Federalism and the Railroad 
Problem, 97 YALE L.J. 1017, 1017 (1988) (describing the Gilded Age as a period in which “the economics 
and the politics of business regulation were going through a period of convulsive change”). 
111 143 U.S. 649, 692-93 (1892). 
112 Id. at 680. 
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reference to trade and commerce” and noted that this “fact is entitled to great 
weight in determining the question before us.”113 But the Field Court was 
more emphatic than the Marshall Court about the signficance of the 
underlying principle: that “Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the 
President is a principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity and 
maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution.”114 
And the Court was more willing to try to draw the line between permissible 
and impermissible delegation.115 Justice Harlan explained, 
[The challenged portion of the Tariff Act of 1890] is not inconsistent with that 
principle. It does not, in any real sense, invest the President with the power of 
legislation. . . . Congress itself determined that the provision of the [A]ct . . . should 
be suspended as to any country producing and exporting [certain goods], that 
imposed exactions and duties on the agricultural and other products of the United 
States, which the President deemed, that is, which he found to be, reciprocally 
unequal and unreasonable. Congress itself prescribed in advance the duties to be 
levied, collected and paid . . . . Nothing involving the expediency or the just 
operation of such legislation was left to the determination of the President.”116 
The President had “no discretion,” but merely “ascertained the existence 
of a particular fact” that Congress had specified as necessary to trigger certain 
statutory features.117 “Legislative power was exercised when Congress 
declared that the suspension should take effect upon a named contingency.”118 
The President was not exercising legislative will and “making law[],” but was 
a “mere agent of the law-making department to ascertain and declare the 
event upon which its expressed will was to take effect.”119 Citing earlier state 
court decisions, the Court put the emphasis on the locus of “discretion.”120 
Whatever governmental agency was exercising discretion was exercising the 
lawmaking function: Congress was not delegating lawmaking power if it 
simply specified a series of conditions under which different statutory 
provisions would come into effect and designated an agent to determine 
whether those conditions had been met.121 
The Court did address the more standard problem of the administrative 
state a few years later, but obscured the challenge that it posed to how the 
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Justices had previously discussed the nondelegation principle. The Court 
backed into the issue through a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to a state 
mine regulation.122 The statute simply directed that an inspector inspect each 
mine “as often as he may deem it necessary and proper.”123 The question before 
the Court was whether it was consistent with the requirements of 
constitutional due process to give executive officials discretion to classify mines 
and determine a schedule of inspections.124 Absent “abuse of . . . discretion” 
by the inspectors, the Court was unconcerned that they were entrusted with 
discretionary authority.125 
In justifying this position, the Court recognized that while “legislative power 
cannot be delegated,” there are “some exceptions to the rule” in which Congress 
can create conditional statutes that utilize presidential discretion—as in Aurora 
and Field; the Court then pivoted without explanation to the present situation, 
finding the mining regulation to be a reasonable exception to the nondelegation 
rule.126 The Court held that “in case the legislature find[s] it impracticable to 
classify the mines for the purposes of inspection, [it can] commit that power 
to a body of experts who are not only experienced in the operation of mines, but 
are acquainted with the details necessary to be known to make a reasonable 
classification.”127 Although framed in the context of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
the Court’s claim about nondelegation was a general one. It simply seemed 
“obviously necessary” that something as fact-specific as how often a particular 
mine needed to be inspected be determined “by some executive officer” with 
the requisite “practical knowledge” to make such decisions.128 
Shortly afterwards, in a case involving the Secretary of Treasury’s discretionary 
authority to exclude adulterated tea from the American marketplace, the 
Court married the reasoning of Field to this new concern about the expert 
knowledge of executive officials.129 In Buttfield v. Stranahan, the Court 
referenced Field to claim that “Congress legislated on the subject as far as was 
reasonably practicable” and that denying Congress the power to invest 
executive officials with discretionary power would functionally declare “that 
the plenary power vested in Congress to regulate foreign commerce could not 
be efficaciously exerted.”130 The delegation of discretionary authority to 
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executive officers was simply a necessary and proper means for exercising an 
enumerated power. An executive official’s use of discretionary power “was 
committed to his judgment, to be honestly exercised,” and the Court declined 
to decide whether the executive official’s standards may have been different 
from Congress’s intent.131 
From there, the Court was open to Congress deciding whether to investigate 
and address if individual bridges obstructed interstate commerce and then 
legislate regarding each bridge or declare “a general rule and impose[] upon the 
Secretary of War the duty of ascertaining what particular cases came within the 
rule prescribed by Congress.”132 So long as the Secretary of War “will only 
execute the clearly expressed will of Congress,” then “[h]e could not be said to 
exercise strictly legislative or judicial power.”133 It was “impracticable in view of 
the vast and varied interests which require National legislation from time to 
time” for Congress to occupy itself with investigating individual obstructions to 
interstate commerce.134 Simply stating that “navigation should be freed from 
unreasonable obstructions” was sufficient guidance to executive officials.135 If 
Congress could not take such a step, it would “stop the wheels of government” and 
“bring about confusion, if not paralysis, in the conduct of the public business.”136 
In a subsequent case, the Court went even further and asserted that 
executive officers “did not legislate” so long as they “did not go outside of the 
circle of that which the act itself had affirmatively required to be done, or 
treated as unlawful if done.”137 If government officials were “confining 
themselves within the field covered by the statute,” it did not matter that 
there was no apparent expressed will of Congress regarding the specific rules 
to be issued by the executive branch.138 
By the Progressive Era, the Court was willing to characterize almost any action 
that a government official performed as nonlegislative. When the Interstate 
Commerce Commission required all of its regulated businesses to adopt a uniform 
system of accounting, the Court said that this was simply “the carrying out of 
details” regarding a statutory directive that required regulated businesses to 
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supply an annual report to the Commission.139 It was sufficient that Congress 
“laid down general rules for the guidance of the Commission.”140 
In another case, the Court examined whether delegating to a board the 
power to censor films that were not “educational, moral, amusing or harmless” 
violated the nondelegation principle by failing to provide any protection 
against the “arbitrary judgment, whim and caprice” of the censor.141 The 
Court attempted to assuage this concern by assuring the film industry that 
such “general terms[] get precision from the sense and experience of men.”142 
The Court reasoned that if legislatures were required to be more specific when 
empowering government officials, “the many administrative agencies created by 
the state and [n]ational governments would be denuded of their utility and 
government in some of its most important exercises [would] become impossible.”143 
Similarly, in Mahler v. Eby, the Court held that, although the “executive 
may not exercise [the power to expel aliens] without congressional authority,” 
Congress may delegate the authority to deport “undesirable residents of the 
United States.”144 “[T]he expression ‘undesirable residents of the United 
States’ is sufficiently definite” to delegate this authority and guide the 
executive branch.145 After all, our “history has created a common understanding 
of the words ‘undesirable residents’ which gives them the quality of a 
recognized standard.”146 
In a different case, Congress had delegated to the Federal Radio Commission 
sweeping authority to allocate radio frequencies.147 The Court held that if the 
courts interpreted the guidelines that licenses be granted “as public convenience, 
interest, or necessity requires” as not “so indefinite as to confer an unlimited 
power,” then the Commission would be implementing the will of Congress 
rather than exercising legislative discretion.148 Furthermore, in Wisconsin v. 
Illinois, the Court assured the states bordering Lake Michigan that the 
Secretary of War was not exercising legislative authority when he issued 
permits allowing the construction of canals that lowered the level of the lake 
because such matters were “a peculiarly expert question” and thus “naturally 
within the executive function.”149 All of these cases suggest an underlying 
principle that restrains the nondelegation doctrine. Specifically, if something 
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seems “impracticable for Congress” to do, then it can be delegated as an 
“administrative function[].”150 
Chief Justice William Howard Taft’s opinion in J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. 
United States is notable for attempting to propound a clearer and more robust 
doctrine for evaluating legislative delegations.151 In the Tariff Act of 1922, 
Congress created a “flexible tariff provision” that authorized the President to 
adjust tariff duties on imported goods to erase any gap between the production 
costs of those goods in the United States and competing foreign countries.152 The 
Court reasoned that it would be practically difficult for Congress to determine 
by itself differences in relative costs and make timely adjustments to tariffs in 
response; thus, delegating the authority to make such determinations and set 
duties accordingly was reasonably delegated to a tariff commission.153 
In justifying this outcome, Chief Justice Taft offered a more elaborate 
statement of the nondelegation principle than the Court had previously done. 
Quoting the “well-known maxim ‘Delegata potestas non potest delegari,’”154 Taft 
stated it would be “a breach of the National fundamental law if Congress gives 
up its legislative power and transfers it to the President.”155 Congress was free 
to “seek[] assistance” and “invoke the action” of the other branches so long as 
“the action invoked shall not be an assumption of the constitutional field of 
action of another branch.”156 But determining whether the legislature had 
gone too far was a matter of “common sense and the inherent necessities of 
the governmental co-ordination.”157 So long as “Congress shall lay down by 
legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to 
fix such rates is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden 
delegation of legislative power.”158 Executive officials did not exercise the 
“power of legislation” if “nothing involving the expediency or just operation 
of such legislation was left to [their] determination.”159 In such circumstances, 
the executive was “the mere agent of the law-making department,” no matter how 
much discretion might be allowed when exercising that agency.160 The “intelligible 
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principle” standard remains the Court’s primary vehicle for assessing whether 
an impermissible delegation of legislative power has taken place.161 
Prior to 1935 the Court had never struck down a federal statutory provision 
as an unconstitutional delegation of power to the executive. When it did so 
in considering provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, the 
Court purported to apply the same standards that it had traditionally used in 
nondelegation cases.162 As the Court construed it, the provision at issue in 
Panama Refining “gives to the President an unlimited authority to determine 
the policy and to lay down the prohibition, or not to lay it down, as he may 
see fit.”163 In sum, “Congress left the matter to the President without standard 
or rule, to be dealt with as he pleased.”164 Congress had authorized action, but 
had not set forth any policy regarding what sort of action ought to be taken 
and in what circumstances. 
But even in striking down the “hot oil” provision, the Court emphasized, 
[L]egislation must often be adapted to complex conditions involving a host of 
details with which the national legislature cannot deal directly. The Constitution 
has never been regarded as denying to the Congress the necessary resources 
of flexibility and practicality, which will enable it to perform its function in 
laying down policies and establishing standards, while leaving to selected 
instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules within prescribed limits.165 
Nonetheless, the Court had always said there were some limits to the 
ability of Congress to delegate rulemaking authority to others.166 The Court 
thought the early New Deal statutes were unique in establishing “no 
requirement, no definition of circumstances and conditions in which” the 
President should or should not act.167 Congress had not made a policy; it had 
delegated to the President the authority to make a policy regarding a specified 
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subject matter. Congress had done what the Court had previously said it 
could not—it had granted an executive official “unlimited power” over a 
particular subject matter.168 
Given this history of purported doctrinal continuity, it is perhaps not 
surprising that the Court did not repudiate the nondelegation arguments in 
the 1935 cases. After the 1937 “switch in time,” the Court continued to address 
nondelegation claims in generally the same terms as it had before the New 
Deal. The Court, for example, distinguished the Tobacco Inspection Act of 
1935 from the National Industrial Recovery Act, claiming this “is not a case 
where Congress has attempted to abdicate, or to transfer to others, the 
essential legislative functions with which it is vested by the Constitution.”169 
The Court was back to emphasizing that “legislation must often be adapted 
to conditions involving details with which it is impracticable for the 
legislature to deal directly.”170 
In the Tobacco Inspection Act, the directive that the Secretary of Agriculture 
“establish standards for tobacco by which its type, grade, size, condition, or 
other characteristics may be determined”171 was of a kind with “familiar 
legislative practice” and was sufficient for Congress to “set forth its policy” for 
the executive to follow.172 Similarly, the Court found Congress appropriately 
delegated its authority in the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 by 
stating “the purpose which the Congress seeks to accomplish and the standards 
by which that purpose is to be worked out with sufficient exactness to enable those 
affected to understand these limits.”173 The Court noted, “Congress needs specify 
only so far as is reasonably practicable.”174 With the Agricultural Adjustment 
Act of 1938, Congress delineated the “considerations which are to be held in view” 
when the Secretary of Agriculture sets production quotas and also provided 
subsequent administrative and judicial review “to correct errors,” which was 
sufficient to “protect against arbitrary action” by an executive official.175 
Regarding the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935, the Court 
concluded that, “in the hands of experts[,] the criteria which Congress has 
supplied [for fixing coal prices] are wholly adequate for carrying out the 
general policy and purpose of the Act.”176 The Court again warned that “if 
Congress were under the constitutional compulsion of filling in the details” of 
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the policy, then “the burdens of minutiae would be apt to clog the administration 
of the law and deprive the agency of that flexibility and dispatch which are 
its salient virtues.”177 
When confronted with a nondelegation challenge to the wartime Emergency 
Price Control Act of 1942, the Court again highlighted the differences between 
the “exercise by Congress of its legislative power” represented by this statute 
and the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) struck down in Schechter.178 
In the wartime statute, Congress “has stated the legislative objective, has 
prescribed the method of achieving that objective—maximum price fixing—, and 
has laid down standards to guide the administrative determination of both 
the occasions for the exercise of the price-fixing power, and the particular 
prices to be established.”179 By contrast, in NIRA, a Depression Era statute, 
Congress “prescribed no method of attaining that end save by the establishment 
of codes of fair competition, the nature of whose permissible provisions was 
left undefined” and “provided no standards to which those codes were to 
conform.”180 The Court observed that the “essentials of the legislative 
function are the determination of the legislative policy and its formulation and 
promulgation as a defined and binding rule of conduct.”181 The Constitution 
“does not demand the impossible or the impracticable.”182 
A review of the Court’s treatment of challenges to federal and state statutes 
on the grounds that they had impermissibly delegated legislative power to 
nonlegislative actors does not provide much basis for thinking that there was 
ever a seriously confining nondelegation doctrine as part of the effective 
constitutional order. The New Deal cases of 1935 do not represent a routine 
effort by the Court to defend traditional separation-of-powers principles, and the 
constitutional revolution of 1937 did little to delineate a meaningful constitutional 
rule regarding the delegation of lawmaking authority. The Court had long 
recognized that legislative power as such could not be delegated, and the Court 
continued to maintain that idea after 1937. But the Justices simultaneously 
had long insisted that this principle had to be understood in a way that was 
practical and did not clog the machinery of modern government. The Court 
repeatedly emphasized that the nondelegation principle was no obstacle to 
the rise of the administrative state. The Court simply noted there had to be 
some limit as to how much authority Congress could delegate. 
Although the Justices tended to shy away from drawing a definite line 
around the power to delegate, the line they suggested was constantly in 
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retreat as Congress delegated more authority to other government officials 
and the Court sanctioned those moves. At the extreme, Congress could not 
simply pass off a policy domain to the executive branch with no indication of 
what the executive was to do in that authority. From that perspective, the New 
Deal cases look less like business as usual under the classical Constitution 
than an extraordinary instance of congressional abdication of exactly the sort 
that the Court had long cautioned against. When the Court once again began to 
approve New Deal delegations of regulatory authority to administrative agencies 
and executive officials, its actions suggest less that a part of the Constitution 
had been thrown into exile than the return to normalcy. With a modicum of 
specificity, Congress could provide the “adequate” policy guidance that the 
Court had long required for a statute to pass constitutional muster.183 
C. The Doctrine in State and Lower Federal Courts 
Over the course of its history, the Supreme Court has addressed relatively 
few nondelegation challenges to statutes. The Court’s own explanation of the 
source and logic of the nondelegation principle has been thin, and the 
doctrine the Court has articulated to determine whether the delegation of 
policymaking authority is constitutionally permissible has been vague. While 
some other features of federal constitutional law that came under challenge 
in the New Deal period were robust and the subject of frequent deliberation 
and detailed analysis on the part of the Justices,184 the nondelegation doctrine 
largely languished in the shadows. 
Even so, the nondelegation principle was a familiar part of the constitutional 
landscape of the nineteenth century. The venerable Thomas Cooley stated plainly, 
One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power conferred 
upon the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that department to 
any other body or authority. Where the sovereign power of the State has 
located the authority, there it must remain; and by the constitutional agency 
alone the laws must be made until the constitution itself is changed.185 
But Cooley was as likely to turn to the supreme courts of the states as to 
the Supreme Court of the United States when identifying the settled maxims 
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of American constitutional law. The state supreme courts and lower federal 
courts had numerous opportunities to hear litigants argue that statutes had 
impermissibly delegated the legislative power to other government officials 
and to develop a judicial understanding of what the prohibition on the 
excessive delegation of lawmaking authority actually meant in practice. 
In this Section, we consider how state courts and lower federal courts 
elaborated the nondelegation doctrine from the Founding Era through the 
New Deal. These courts were more active than the U.S. Supreme Court, and 
often more articulate and elaborate in explaining the logic of the Constitution’s 
nondelegation principle. But these courts likewise refrained from imposing 
sharp limits on legislative discretion to shift important swaths of policymaking 
to other government officials, and they too erected few practical barriers to 
the rise of the modern administrative state and the expansive executive role 
in initiating and designing regulatory policy. 
In 1799, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania heard America’s first 
nondelegation challenge.186 The statute at issue was passed by the Pennsylvania 
state legislature and empowered the city of Philadelphia to proscribe the 
construction of wooden homes as it “may judge proper.”187 In accordance with 
the statute, the city government enacted an ordinance banning the construction 
of wooden homes in a section of Philadelphia, and the defendant Philip 
Duquet was indicted for violating this ordinance.188 Duquet admitted to 
building a wooden home but argued that the city lacked the authority to make 
such a law.189 That power, he maintained, was the exclusive prerogative of the 
state assembly and could not be delegated to the city.190 
In making his case, Duquet first noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution 
vested all legislative power in the general assembly.191 Next, he appealed to the 
common law maxim delegata potestas non potest delegari to persuade the court 
that this ordinance violated a fundamental constitutional principle—namely 
that power delegated by the people may not be redelegated to another 
institution.192 The people had entrusted the state assembly alone with the 
power to legislate, and any subsequent delegation by the assembly would be 
an abdication of its responsibility.193 Despite a lengthy argument by Duquet, 
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the Pennsylvania Supreme Court disposed of the nondelegation question 
simply by stating, “We however see no such [constitutional] violation in the 
present case, and therefore give judgment for the commonwealth.”194 
With that, the first nondelegation challenge was stopped in its tracks. It 
would be nearly three decades before any state court heard another case 
regarding the constitutionality of legislative delegation. When that time came, 
however, courts began to give more credence to nondelegation challenges. 
Given that the U.S. Supreme Court had taken up the issue of nondelegation 
in three separate cases following the Pennsylvania decision,195 it is not 
surprising that judges began to feel compelled to acknowledge the doctrine 
as an important principle and to provide arguments justifying their rulings. 
Unlike in Duquet, it was no longer acceptable to simply declare the statute 
constitutional without further explanation. The next case to reach the state 
courts, In re Adams,196 illustrates the beginnings of this shift. 
In Adams, decided in 1826, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
had to determine whether the state legislature could delegate to the governor 
and his council the power “to organize and arrange the militia of this 
commonwealth, conformably to the laws of the United States, and to make 
such alterations therein, as, from time to time, may be deemed necessary.”197 
The court held that the delegation had to be constitutional because a contrary 
ruling “would lead to great difficulties and embarrassments” that would 
prevent the government from functioning effectively.198 
In reaching this conclusion, the justices highlighted the fact that prior to 
delegating its authority to the governor, the state legislature had been 
delegated the authority to organize the militia by a higher power—the United 
States Congress.199 Because the Constitution requires Congress—not the 
states—“[t]o provide for organizing, arming and disciplining, the Militia,”200 
if the state legislature’s delegation to the governor were unconstitutional, then 
Congress’s delegation to the state legislature would likewise be unconstitutional.201 
This, the court held, would be an absurd result.202 
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Notably, the justices did leave open the possibility that there could be 
unconstitutional delegations of power. In the court’s view, the salient factor 
was whether the original holder of authority ceded its “controlling power” to 
another body.203 In this instance, neither Congress nor the state legislature  
relinquished control. For that reason, the statute was constitutional. 
As courts began to work out more precise contours of the nondelegation 
doctrine, they frequently looked to constitutional and jurisprudential maxims 
to help define the permissible limits of delegation. The aforementioned 
maxim delegata potestas non potest delegari was one of the most influential.204 
Although some courts saw this as a near absolute prohibition on delegation,205 
most took a more nuanced view.206 As the Supreme Court of Michigan wrote 
in 1854, “it is in the very nature of legislative power, that it may, to some 
extent at least, be delegated, and that the maxim, delegata potestas, non potest 
delegari, has no application” in some cases.207 Likewise, the Missouri Supreme 
Court stated that “[a]lthough it be true, as a general proposition, that the 
legislature can not delegate their legislative power, but must exercise it 
themselves under their appropriate responsibilities,” there are many longstanding 
exceptions to this rule.208 
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This idea that historical practice limited the scope of the nondelegation 
doctrine was very powerful.209 Even when the text of the state constitution 
seemed to enshrine the nondelegation doctrine by vesting all legislative 
power in the state assembly, many courts appealed to historical practice to 
justify allowing legislative delegations.210 Ultimately, when rejecting 
nondelegation challenges, courts generally took a pragmatic view of the 
situation and upheld those delegations that they deemed necessary for the 
government to accomplish its goals.211 
Although such exceptions to the nondelegation doctrine were prevalent, 
they did not completely swallow the rule. The constitutional principle of 
separation of powers served as a counterweight against giving legislatures too 
much latitude.212 Courts knew that if the branches of government could 
delegate their powers however they saw fit, then the carefully constructed 
system of checks and balances would disintegrate, and the people would 
quickly find their liberties curtailed. An 1843 case decided by the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court illustrates this concern: 
It is on the preservation of the lines which separate the cardinal branches of 
the government, that the liberties of the citizen depend; for a consolidated 
sovereignty, in whatever form, is a despotism in so far as it subjects the 
governed . . . and a government becomes consolidated in proportion as its 
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have, and are universally conceded to have, the power to act by means of agents . . . . Without such 
power the Legislature would be an unwieldy body, incapable of accomplishing one-half of the great 
purposes for which it was created.”). 
212 See, e.g., State v. Field, 17 Mo. 529, 532 (1853) (invalidating a statute that contained a 
provision permitting the courts to refuse to enforce a statute because such a legislative delegation 
violated the constitutional requirement that “the powers of government shall be divided into three 
departments, each of which shall be confided to a separate magistracy”). 
410 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 165: 379 
legislative branch abandons its own functions, or usurps those which have 
been vested elsewhere.213 
The people had entrusted specific powers to the legislatures for carefully 
considered reasons. When upholding the constitutionality of legislative 
delegations, courts needed to ensure that such delegations would not 
destabilize the delicately balanced separation of powers. In re Adams posited 
a solution to this problem.214 Specifically, the separation of powers principle 
does not mandate a complete prohibition of all delegations. Instead, it simply 
requires the original branch of government to retain “controlling power” over 
the given domain.215 The legislature is free to delegate its powers so long as 
the delegation provides clear guidelines.216 If the delegation provides another 
body with arbitrary discretion, then it fails this test and must be declared 
unconstitutional.217 In upholding a delegation that permitted the voters to set 
the location of the county seat, the Supreme Court of California gave one of 
the earliest articulations of this idea: 
By the Constitution the Legislature is required to provide for many objects 
which cannot be effected by the direct action of the Legislature, and while 
the maxim delegatus non potest delegare, is undoubtedly true, the extent of its 
application to legislative bodies must depend upon the nature and design of 
the legislation and the means necessary to accomplish the design, as well as a 
knowledge of the powers of the Legislature and the acts which may be done 
in the exercise of those powers.218 
In other words, when assessing the constitutionality of a delegation, 
courts should look to the purpose of the legislation and the method by which 
the legislature has directed its agent to accomplish that purpose. If the 
legislature’s desired outcome were reasonably specified and the method of 
reaching that outcome seemed appropriate, these factors would weigh heavily 
in favor of finding the delegation constitutional. Despite being expounded in 
1857, this standard is remarkably similar to the “intelligible principle” standard 
 
213 In re Borough of W. Phila., 5 Watts & Serg. 281, 283 (Pa. 1843). 
214 See supra notes 196–203 and accompanying text. 
215 See In re Adams, 21 Mass. (4 Pick.) 25, 29 (1826) (noting that the Framers of the Constitution 
intended to give Congress a controlling power in organizing the militia either by organizing the 
militia themselves or directing others to organize it). 
216 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372-73 (1989) (holding that Congress could delegate 
power to a judicial branch commission charged with promulgating binding sentencing guidelines). 
217 See Can. N. Ry. v. Int’l Bridge Co., 7 F. 653, 656 (N.D.N.Y. 1880) (upholding a statute 
delegating to courts the power to ascertain whether railroad companies have equal privileges in using 
a certain bridge because the statute intended for “this decision [to] proceed upon settled principles 
of law and equity, and not upon arbitrary discretion,” thereby suggesting that a legislature that 
granted arbitrary power in the course of delegation would act unconstitutionally). 
218 Upham v. Supervisors of Sutter Cty., 8 Cal. 378, 382-83 (1857). 
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adopted by the Supreme Court more than seventy years later in J.W. 
Hampton.219 Not only did the two have similar criteria—they also yielded 
similar outcomes. Much like the Supreme Court, the state and lower federal 
courts rarely met a principle that was not “intelligible.”220 But when they did, 
it was for the same reason given by the Supreme Court: the legislature had 
conferred too much discretion upon the delegatee.221 
That said, determining precisely what amounts to too much discretion 
proved to be a hard task. In their attempts to resolve this issue, courts turned 
to several more tractable questions to measure whether this line had been 
crossed. First, was the group upon whom the legislature conferred power 
qualified to carry out the delegated task? And second, in delegating the power, 
was the legislature abdicating its responsibility to the public or shielding itself 
from electoral accountability? 
With respect to the first factor, courts were likely to find the statute 
unconstitutional when it delegated power to a group that was not fit to wield the 
power. Generally, this test was used to invalidate delegations to the electorate. 
Early on, many courts simply did not think voters were capable of wielding 
meaningful legislative authority.222 The Supreme Court of Delaware stated,  
[People are] incompetent . . . to exercise with discernment and discretion, 
collectively, or by means of the ballot-box, the power of legislation; because, 
under such circumstances, passion and prejudice incapacitate them for 
deliberation; and the tricks of demagogues, excited feelings, party animosities, 
 
219 See supra text accompanying notes 151–60. 
220 See supra text accompanying notes 186–211. 
221 See supra text accompanying notes 212–18. 
222 See Thorne v. Cramer, 15 Barb. 112, 117 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1851) (“The doctrine that no harm 
can result from allowing the people to exercise, directly, the law-making power, is more plausible 
than sound. . . . It is hardly necessary to say, that many voters are not in all respects qualified to 
become governors or legislators. They may have discretion enough to select suitable men for those 
offices; but if they were put directly to the business of framing laws themselves, they would be quite 
out of their element. Can we not then foresee dangers to arise from a delegation of the legislative 
franchise, even to the people themselves?”); Parker v. Commonwealth, 6 Pa. 507, 520 (1847) (“[I]f 
the two houses can divest themselves of their office of law-makers, and devolve it upon the body of 
the people, what security have we against the passage of laws, perhaps well meant, but liable to be 
glaringly wrong, because inconsiderately adopted? [A]nd what check is left us upon hasty and ill-advised 
zeal, open to be influenced and misguided by interested, cunning, or blind fanaticism? If the practice 
be sanctioned, there may follow a train of experiments which, unarrested at some point of their 
progress, must end in the final overthrow of the constitution. Every case of doubtful propriety will 
be referred to the result of a ballot; and acts of Assembly, subject to the popular vote, will be yielded 
to unthinking clamor or partisan importunity . . . .”). But see State v. Parker, 26 Vt. 357, 364 (1854) 
(“Does any one seriously doubt the perfect propriety of the legislature, upon questions of general 
policy, affecting equally the whole state, acting upon the known will of the state, where that is 
known? We suppose not.”). 
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and the corrupting influences always brought to bear upon popular elections, 
would banish reason, reflection, and judgment.223  
Although the exact limits of the competence of the electorate—or any other 
delegatee—can be disputed, the underlying principle is sound: to be the 
object of delegation, one must be able to exercise the power in a rational 
manner. If the delegatee is incapable of satisfying this condition, then the 
legislature has granted too much discretion. 
The second factor many courts considered was whether the legislature had 
abdicated its responsibility to the public. In particular, did the delegation 
permit so much discretion that the legislature could reasonably disclaim 
ownership of the law and thereby shield itself from electoral accountability? If 
it did, that would weaken the constitutionally mandated connection between 
legislative action and electoral accountability that is at the very core of the 
American political system. 
Ensuring that the appropriate branch of government was answerable for 
its actions was so important that many judges feared “shifting responsibility 
[would] introduce innovations upon our system, which would result in the 
overthrow and ultimate destruction of our political fabric.”224 Courts were 
certain that, if left unchecked, “faithless legislators anxious to escape the 
responsibility of their position” would abuse delegation to ensure their 
political survival.225 Such action, the courts knew, would be a severe breach 
of the trust that the people had placed in their elected representatives.226 
In advancing the accountability argument, courts also analogized to other 
branches of government by observing that neither the executive nor the 
judiciary could delegate away their powers. In fact, to even contemplate such 
a possibility would be “absurd.”227 As one New York state court wrote, 
 
 
223 Rice v. Foster, 4 Del. (4 Harr.) 479, 489-90 (1847). 
224 Franklin Bridge Co. v. Wood, 14 Ga. 80, 83 (1853). 
225 Parker, 6 Pa. at 520. 
226 See, e.g., Moore v. Allen, 30 Ky. (7 J.J. Marsh.) 651, 652 (1832) (“The power confided to 
members of congress is a personal trust, which can not be transferred by them. When called on to 
account to their constituents for their conduct, it would be at war with our whole system to excuse 
[legislators] upon the ground that they had delegated their powers to [another body].”). 
227 See Rice, 4 Del. (4 Harr.) at 489 (“If the legislative functions can be transferred or delegated 
to the people, so can the executive or judicial power. The absurd spectacle of a governor referring it 
to a popular vote, whether a criminal, convicted of a capital offence, should be pardoned or executed, 
would be the subject of universal ridicule: and were a court of justice, instead of deciding a case 
themselves, to direct the prothonotary to enter judgment for the plaintiff, or defendant, according 
to the popular vote of a county, the community would be disgusted with the folly, injustice, and 
iniquity of the proceeding.”). 
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[T]he same reasoning that would permit a legislator to transfer his power to 
his constituents, would authorize any other elective officer to do the same. 
Thus the governor when applied to, to pardon a criminal, might, being 
unwilling to take the responsibility of deciding upon the application himself, 
call an election and submit it to the people. The courts, whenever a case of 
peculiar difficulty came before them, might call together their constituents to 
ascertain how the popular feeling stood. . . . Every person must perceive how 
preposterous such a proceeding would be! And how deservedly contemptible 
every officer and court who should resort to such means of evading the just 
responsibilities of his office, would be held.228 
In one egregious instance of delegation, the Missouri state legislature 
passed a law that gave the county courts complete discretion to suspend the 
operation of that law.229 The statute contained no limiting principle. If at any 
time, the court determined “that the provisions of the act should not be 
enforced,” it could simply decline to enforce them.230 In striking down the 
delegation as unconstitutional, the Missouri Supreme Court emphasized that 
it is “the duty of the legislature to exercise the powers upon their own 
responsibility. . . . [T]he power, thus committed by the people into the hands 
of their constitutional representatives, is not to be delegated to others not 
trusted by the people.”231 
In another case, the Tennessee legislature delegated to courts the power 
to set taxes “upon all polls and property subject to taxation by the laws of this 
State.”232 The legislature did not specify rates of taxation or even whether 
certain types of property should be taxed more or less heavily than any other. 
The only requirement was that the courts assess taxes sufficient “to meet the 
current expenses of their county for the ensuing year.”233 
In reviewing the constitutionality of the delegation, Tennessee’s highest 
court asked, 
[W]hat limit to exactions is imposed by the act . . . ? We answer, none. [The 
courts] may tax every acre in their respective counties to its full value, and if 
the tax is not paid, cause the land to be sold and bought in by the sheriff . . . if 
there be no other bidders.234  
 
228 Thorne v. Cramer, 15 Barb. 112, 116-17 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1851). 
229 State v. Field, 17 Mo. 529, 530 (1853). 
230 Id. 
231 Id. at 536. 
232 Marr v. Enloe, 9 Tenn. (1 Yer.) 452, 453 (1830). 
233 Id. 
234 Id. at 454. 
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Under this system, tax rates are set solely by the caprice of judges.235 Such a 
delegation, the court ruled, was unconstitutional. 
These cases are not outliers. Rather, they are representative of the kinds 
of delegations that state and lower federal courts held to be unconstitutional 
during the nineteenth century. If anything about the nondelegation doctrine’s 
history is surprising, it is that legislatures once thought it appropriate to 
delegate such expansive powers, not that courts saw fit to strike them down. 
Since the beginning, the limits of the nondelegation doctrine have remained 
constant. To the extent that its influence appears diminished, it is because the 
set of cases is different. If this year, Congress were to delegate all taxing power 
to the judiciary or entrust judges to determine whether a law should be 
enforced, there is no doubt the courts would hold those statutes to be 
unconstitutional. Modern judges, however, are not confronted with such 
profoundly unconstitutional delegations. Instead, today’s disputes hew much 
closer to the constitutional line. 
In delineating the contours of the nondelegation doctrine, courts justified 
their decisions by appealing to three forms of support: (1) precedent, (2) maxims, 
and (3) constitutional text. Table 1 illustrates the percentage of federal and 
state cases that cited to each of these forms of support. As the data show, 
courts most frequently invoked precedent, followed by maxims, and finally 
constitutional text. 
The Table further breaks down the cases into those that found the 
delegation to be constitutional and those that found it to be unconstitutional. 
Unsurprisingly, when striking down a statute, both state and federal courts 
were more likely to cite a precedent, invoke a maxim, or quote constitutional 
text to support their ruling. A chi-square test also reveals that federal courts 
were significantly more likely than state courts to cite precedent when 
striking down a statute and that state courts were significantly more likely 
than federal courts to quote constitutional text regardless of whether the 
statute was ruled invalid. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
235 Id. at 454-55 (“Until county courts by its order (clearly amounting to a legislative act) 
imposes the tax, the people have no knowledge what they have to pay; nor have they any knowledge 
afforded them, even by the order fixing the tax . . . .”). 
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Table 1: Percentage of Constitutional and  
Unconstitutional Delegations for Which the  
Federal and State Courts Cited Support  
 
 Precedent Maxim Constitution 
 Con. Uncon. Con. Uncon. Con. Uncon. 
Federal 56% 88% 19% 44% 6% 27% 
State 54% 68% 19% 32% 20% 43% 
χ2 statistic 0.44 6.96** 0.0007 2.21 36.19*** 4.19* 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
 
Because we have already discussed the importance of maxims and precedent 
in nondelegation cases, we focus our attention here on the differing role 
constitutional text plays in state and federal cases. We highlight one distinction 
in particular: whereas the nondelegation doctrine is only implicit in the U.S. 
Constitution, it is explicit in most state constitutions. As Gary Lawson has 
observed, “there is nothing in the [U.S.] Constitution that specifically states, 
in precise terms, that no other actor may exercise legislative power or that 
Congress may not authorize other actors to exercise legislative power.”236 
Accordingly, given the lack of a specific nondelegation clause, scholars 
have derived support for the doctrine from Article I, Section 1 of the U.S. 
Constitution. This provision reads, “All legislative Powers herein granted 
shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate 
and House of Representatives.”237 From here, federal courts have inferred the 
existence of the nondelegation doctrine,238 reading this Section to require 
that judges “guard jealously against any attempt of the legislative authority to 
delegate its power to others.”239 
 
236 Lawson, supra note 4, at 335; see also Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance 
of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 478 (1989) (stating that the nondelegation 
doctrine is not expressly grounded in the text of the Constitution); Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 
67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 322 (2000) (indicating that the text of the Constitution does not provide 
unambiguous support for the conventional nondelegation doctrine).  
237 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
238 See, e.g., Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42-43 (1825) (“It will not be contended 
that Congress can delegate to the Courts, or to any other tribunals, powers which are strictly and 
exclusively legislative.”); see also Andreas v. Clark, 71 F.2d 908, 910 (9th Cir. 1934) (citing Wayman v. 
Southard for the proposition that Congress cannot delegate powers which are exclusively legislative); 
United States v. Griffin, 12 F. Supp. 135, 136 (S.D. Ga. 1935) (invoking Article I, Section 1 of the U.S. 
Constitution to strike down an act that “attempts unlawfully to delegate legislative authority to the 
Executive Department of the United States”). 
239 United States v. Edwards, 14 F. Supp. 384, 393 (S.D. Cal. 1936) (citing Marshall Field & 
Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892)). 
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Unlike the U.S. Constitution, most state constitutions make direct 
reference to the nondelegability of legislative powers and do so in a number 
of ways. First, they emphasize that the state government is a system of 
separation of powers and, as such, no branch of government may exercise 
any powers that are within the proper domain of another branch. Article II, 
Section 1 of the Texas constitution is a representative example. That 
provision states, “The powers of the Government of the State of Texas shall 
be divided into three distinct departments . . . and no person, or collection 
of persons, being of one of these departments, shall exercise any powers 
properly attached to either of the others.”240 
Second, many state constitutions forbid the legislature from making the 
passage of any law contingent upon any event or outside authority. For example, 
Article I, Section 25 of the Indiana constitution has such a provision. It reads 
as follows: “No law shall be passed, the taking effect of which shall be made to 
depend upon any authority, except as provided in this Constitution.”241 
Finally, more than a dozen states explicitly forbid the legislature from 
delegating any of its powers. The language in Article V, Section 35 of the 
Colorado constitution is representative: “The general assembly shall not delegate 
to any special commission, private corporation or association, any power to 
make, supervise or interfere with any municipal improvement, money, 
property or effects, whether held in trust or otherwise, or to levy taxes or 
perform any municipal function whatever.”242 
 
240 TEX. CONST. art. II, § 1; see also ILL. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“The legislative, executive and 
judicial branches are separate. No branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another.”); S.C. 
CONST. art. I, § 8 (“In the government of this State, the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of 
the government shall be forever separate and distinct from each other, and no person exercising the 
functions of one of said departments shall assume or discharge the duties of any other.”); VA. CONST. 
art. III, § 1 (“The legislative, executive, and judicial departments shall be separate and distinct, so that 
none exercise the powers properly belonging to the others, nor any person exercise the power of more 
than one of them at the same time . . . .”); WYO. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“The powers of the government 
of this state are divided into three distinct departments . . . and no person . . . charged with the exercise 
of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any powers properly belonging 
to either of the others . . . .”). 
241 IND. CONST. art. I, § 25; see also OR. CONST. art. 1, § 21 (“[N]or shall any law be passed, the taking 
effect of which shall be made to depend upon any authority, except as provided in this Constitution . . . .”). 
242 COLO. CONST. art. V, § 35; see also CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 13 (1879) (“The legislature shall 
not delegate to any special commission, private corporation, company, association, or individual, any 
power to make, control, appropriate, supervise, or in any way interfere with, any county, city, town, 
or municipal improvement, money, property, or effects, whether held in trust or otherwise, or to 
levy taxes or assessments, or perform any municipal functions whatever.”). For an application of this 
provision, see Mesmer v. Bd. of Pub. Serv. Comm’rs of L.A., 138 P. 935, 935-36 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1913), which applies this provision of the California Constitution of 1879 to limit the general 
lawmaking powers of the Legislature. See also PA. CONST. art. III, § 31 (“The General Assembly shall 
not delegate to any special commission, private corporation or association, any power to make, 
supervise or interfere with any municipal improvement, money, property or effects, whether held in 
trust or otherwise, or to levy taxes or perform any municipal function whatever.”); UTAH CONST. 
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This explicit reference to the nondelegability of legislative powers is a far 
cry from the implicit references found in the U.S. Constitution. By including 
these provisions, states have made clear that the nondelegation doctrine is a 
valuable tool that courts should use to maintain the separation of powers 
between the three branches. Given the more extensive discussion of legislative 
delegations in state constitutions, it should come as no surprise that state 
courts almost never invoke the U.S. Constitution during their discussions of 
the nondelegation doctrine. The surprise is that even with these more robust 
textual supports for the nondelegation doctrine, state courts have still proved 
willing to defer to legislative assessments of when delegating power is 
practical and necessary. 
III. JUDICIAL PRACTICE IN NONDELEGATION CASES 
There is little question that American courts have long recognized a basic 
constitutional principle that legislative powers cannot be delegated to other 
political actors. Having received the legislative power from the sovereign 
people, the elected representatives sitting in a legislature were expected to 
exercise it themselves. But that basic principle was immediately hemmed in by 
qualifications. Legislators were allowed to “commit something to the discretion 
of the other departments” and let the latter “fill up the details” of government 
policy.243 Legislators could reasonably turn to a “body of experts” when filling 
in the policy details themselves would be “impracticable.”244 Courts should 
not force legislatures into “great difficulties and embarrassments.”245 The principle 
of nondelegation had “to be understood in the light of the immemorial 
practice of this country,” which frequently tolerated the delegation of 
lawmaking power to other entities.246 In short, the nondelegation principle 
was never understood to impose substantial burdens on the legislative branch. 
Courts routinely expressed wariness as they approached the “delicate and 
difficult” task of identifying the boundary of the legislative power to bestow 
authority on their agents.247 
 
art. VI, § 28 (“The Legislature shall not delegate to any special commission, private corporation or 
association, any power to make, supervise or interfere with any municipal improvement, money, 
property or effects, whether held in trust or otherwise, to levy taxes, to select a capitol site, or to 
perform any municipal functions.”); WYO. CONST. art. III, § 37 (“The legislature shall not delegate 
to any special commissioner, private corporation or association, any power to make, supervise or 
interfere with any municipal improvements, moneys, property or effects, whether held in trust or 
otherwise, to levy taxes, or to perform any municipal functions whatever.”). 
243 Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43, 46 (1825). 
244 St. Louis Consol. Coal Co. v. Illinois, 185 U.S. 203, 211 (1902). 
245 In re Adams, 21 Mass. (4 Pick.) 25, 29 (1826). 
246 Tilley v. Savannah, 5 F. 641, 657 (C.C.S.D. Ga. 1881). 
247 Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 46. 
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It is one thing to make a statement of constitutional principle; it is another 
to judicially enforce constitutional limits. The proto-realist Oliver Wendell 
Holmes famously characterized the formal law and the reports of judicial 
opinions as simply the materials from which “systematized prediction” of 
future judicial behavior can be made.248 Empirical legal scholars have long 
taken these “prophecies of what the courts will do in fact” as their central 
concern.249 The movement to study “judicial behavior” has been motivated by a 
conviction that judicial opinions and doctrines do not fully capture the reality 
of judicial practice, and that the “impressionistic focus on legal doctrine” is 
inadequate for understanding how political power is actually exercised.250 
In this Part, we turn our attention to judicial practice in the state and federal 
courts from the Founding to the New Deal. Nostalgia for a constitution-in-exile 
is ultimately concerned less with abstract statements of principle than with the 
practical realities of constitutional limitation. Did judges, in fact, act to enforce 
a robust nondelegation constraint on the power and discretion of legislators? If 
so, under what circumstances? Is there evidence that the nineteenth-century 
version of the nondelegation doctrine had actual teeth? 
We begin by surveying the range of nondelegation cases in the state and 
federal courts between the Founding and the constitutional revolution of the 
New Deal period.251 Unless otherwise noted, the analysis in this Part draws 
on a dataset of 2506 cases decided in federal courts and state supreme courts 
between the Founding and 1940. These cases all involved challenges to 
legislative provisions on the grounds that the legislature inappropriately 
delegated lawmaking authority. A total of 421 cases resulted in the partial or 
total invalidation of a statutory provision during this period. Over eighty-five 
percent of the total number of cases were resolved in state supreme courts, 
and ninety percent of the cases striking down legislation took place in state 
courts. The constitutional law and practice of the nondelegation doctrine was 
thus largely written in the states. 
Figure 1 tracks the total set of cases addressing nondelegation constitutional 
challenges to legislative action across time and the number of cases in which 
 
248 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 458 (1897). 
249 Id. at 461. 
250 S. Sidney Ulmer, Judicial Review as Political Behavior: A Temporary Check on Congress, 4 
ADMIN. SCI. Q. 426, 427-28 (1960). 
251 In order to identify nondelegation cases, we conducted the following search on Westlaw for 
all state and federal cases between 1789 and 1940: “TO(‘delegation #of powers’) or (delegat! /2 
legislative /1 (power! or authority)) or (delegat! /2 lawmaking /1 (power! or authority)).” We then 
proceeded to examine every search result to see if the case involved a nondelegation challenge. If it 
did not, we excluded the case from the dataset. If it did, we coded the case along a variety of 
dimensions which we discuss throughout this Part. 
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the court struck down a legislative provision as unconstitutionally delegating 
lawmaking power.252 The figure shows the annual count of the number of cases. 
 
Figure 1: Nondelegation Cases in State 
and Federal Courts, 1825–1940 
 
As the figure makes evident, nondelegation cases were a regular feature 
of constitutional litigation prior to the New Deal, but there were substantial 
changes in their incidence over time. With two exceptions,253 the first cases 
to challenge legislation on the grounds that the legislature inappropriately 
delegated lawmaking authority did not emerge until the 1820s. Even then, 
however, such cases remained relatively rare until the antebellum period. 
Over the course of the second half of the nineteenth century, nondelegation 
cases made a regular appearance on judicial dockets, gradually increasing in 
the last years of the Gilded Age. Nondelegation cases surged at the opening 
of the twentieth century, plateauing at a new level that was several times the 
pace at which such cases were heard in the nineteenth century. In keeping 
with the traditional narrative of the battles of the New Deal, the number of 
 
252 Because only two nondelegation challenges arose prior to 1825, as a practical matter, the 
graphs focuses on cases between 1825 and 1940. 
253 See Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382 (1813); Respublica v. 
Duquet, 2 Yeates 493 (Pa. 1799). 
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nondelegation cases surged again in the 1930s. By the early twentieth century, 
nondelegation cases were a familiar feature of the American constitutional 
environment. 
Despite the growth of nondelegation as an area of litigation, the number 
of judicial invalidations hardly budged. As Figure 1 illustrates, the number of 
cases in which a court struck down a statutory provision in a case raising a 
nondelegation challenge remained on a nearly flat trajectory from the early 
nineteenth century through the early twentieth century. As litigation surged 
in the early decades of the twentieth century, a massive gap emerged between 
the number of cases bringing such challenges and the number of cases that 
were successful. The early 1930s do, however, stand out as an outlier, with a 
brief eruption of cases striking down legislation—an eruption that subsided as 
quickly as it arose. Although the number of cases resulting in an invalidation 
averaged less than one per year prior to 1880, that number remained in the 
low single digits until the 1930s. 
The number of nondelegation cases changed dramatically over the course 
of this period, as did their composition. Table 2 describes the delegatee of the 
lawmaking authority (or the object of delegation) at issue in these cases. It 
divides the data between two periods that largely map onto the change in the 
equilibrium number of cases identified in Figure 1: cases resolved before 1880 
are compared to those resolved after 1880.254 The delegatee of legislation is 
divided into six categories: executive (primarily the chief executive), agency 
(including independent commissions and other bureaucratic bodies), judiciary, 
local government, voters, and others.255 
Table 2 indicates some notable points of continuity in how legislatures 
have sought to delegate power to other political actors over time. The Chief 
Executive has always been one obvious possible object of delegation. The 
classic case of Field v. Clark, for example, involved a delegation to the 
President to determine whether the conditions for a higher tariff rate had 
been met.256 Somewhat surprisingly, given the prominence of cases involving 
the President in the U.S. Supreme Court, such delegations have always been 
relatively rare. The judiciary has been a more common recipient of delegated 
 
254 The transformation described in Table 2 evolved gradually over the final years of the nineteenth 
century and little of substance would be changed by choosing a somewhat different point at which to divide 
the data. These developments are more clearly represented in a table, however, than a figure. 
255 The catch-all “other” category includes such idiosyncratic objects as state legislatures, see, 
e.g., Moore v. Allen, 30 Ky. (7 J.J. Marsh.) 651, 652-53 (1832) (evaluating a federal statute that gave 
federal prisoners the same privileges as possessed by the local state prisoners); surrounding property 
owners, see, e.g., City of Chicago v. Stratton, 58 Ill. App. 539, 544-46 (1895) (evaluating a law 
authorizing neighboring residents to allow or prohibit the location of a livery stable); and private 
corporations, see, e.g., Smith Agric. Chem. Co. v. Calvert, 18 Ohio Dec. 583, 587-88 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 
1908) (evaluating a state statute that authorized the board of agriculture to exercise regulatory powers). 
256 Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692-96 (1892). 
2017] The Myth of the Nondelegation Doctrine 421 
power, as when the Georgia legislature in 1843 delegated to the local courts 
the task of creating corporations.257 But cases questioning such delegations 
are equally represented both early and late in this time period. 
 
Table 2: Objects of Delegation 
 
  
Executive 
 
Agency 
 
Judiciary 
Local 
Gov’t 
 
Voters 
 
Other 
Before  
1880 6% 3% 15% 27% 47% 2% 
After  
1880 5% 52% 13% 24% 8% 10% 
χ2 
statistic 0.04 122.63
*** 3.01 1.02 297.43*** 13.96*** 
*** p < .001 
 
An extremely prominent body of nondelegation cases at the state level is 
virtually unknown at the federal level—delegations from state legislatures to local 
governmental units. Cases determining whether state legislatures can delegate a 
general police power to municipal corporations258 or may delegate the power to 
choose the siting of county buildings to county commissioners259 have been 
common at the state level, shaping the judicial understanding of the meaning of 
the nondelegation principle and its exceptions. Such cases have occupied a 
relatively steady place on state judicial dockets across the decades. 
Table 2 also directs our attention to two important points of discontinuity 
between the delegation in the early nineteenth century and delegation since the 
late nineteenth century. The first is less surprising from a modern perspective. 
Legislative delegations of rulemaking authority to executive agencies gave rise to a 
trivial number of cases prior to 1880. The use of independent regulatory commissions 
and other specialized, expert bureaucratic units was pioneered during the 
Gilded Age, however, and these new devices of governance and administration 
brought with them new constitutional disputes. 
One early example was the creation of the Railroad and Warehouse Commission 
in Illinois in 1871. Pursuant to the legislature’s authority under the state 
constitution to pass laws for the inspection of grain and the protection of 
 
257 See Franklin Bridge Co. v. Wood, 14 Ga. 80, 84-85 (1853) (holding that conferring a mandatory 
duty on courts to give “legal form to these companies” did not unconstitutionally delegate a 
discretionary legislative power). 
258 See, e.g., Sluder v. St. Louis Transit Co., 88 S.W. 648, 650-51 (Mo. 1905) (striking down a 
law that delegated power to private companies to set speed limits for street cars). 
259 See, e.g., Simpson v. Bailey, 3 Or. 515, 518 (1869) (upholding an act of the legislature that 
authorized three commissioners selected by a county court to choose the site of county buildings). 
422 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 165: 379 
producers, shippers, and receivers, the legislature empowered the three-person 
commission to set up a system of regulation and inspection of grain in the 
state.260 Even by 1878, the state supreme court thought it “now too late to 
question the power to create such agencies in the administration of the 
government, and invest them with such legislative power as shall be 
appropriate and necessary to effectuate the objects of their creation.”261 From 
the court’s perspective, there was little difference between the creation of a 
commission to exercise some of the police powers of the state legislature and 
the creation of other corporate bodies such as the “[c]ities, towns, villages, 
counties, townships, road districts and school districts” that were familiar 
features of the political landscape.262 
The most controversial delegation to such railroad commissions in the years 
after the Civil War, however, was the authority to set carriage rates. But even 
here, courts were accommodating. The Minnesota Supreme Court, for example, 
concluded that all that was necessary was for the legislators to determine whether 
rates should be regulated.263 If the “sovereign state” were not to “find itself 
helplessly entangled in the meshes of its own constitution,” then it was necessarily 
the case that “the legislature may authorize others to do things which it might 
properly, but cannot conveniently or advantageously, do itself.”264 
The legislative delegation of authority to an agency is the classic concern of 
modern disputes over the nondelegation doctrine and the central target of 
criticisms of the modern nondelegation doctrine.265 Both the absolute number and 
the relative share of nondelegation cases involving executive agencies steadily grew 
from the 1870s to the New Deal. The growth of such cases—and the underlying 
statutes empowering such institutions—was a primary engine behind the surge of 
nondelegation cases in the early twentieth century observed in Figure 1. 
The second discontinuity is less familiar since it marks a once common 
category of nondelegation cases that subsequently retreated into near invisibility. 
Moreover, these cases were endemic to state politics but largely absent from 
 
260 People v. Harper, 91 Ill. 357, 364-65 (1878). 
261 Id. at 366. 
262 Id. 
263 State ex rel. R.R. & Warehouse Comm’n v. Chi., M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 37 N.W. 782, 787 
(Minn. 1888). 
264 Id. 
265 See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 6, at 1241 (arguing that “the demise of the nondelegation 
doctrine, which allows the national government’s now-general legislative powers to be exercised by 
administrative agencies, has encountered no serious real-world legal or political challenges, and none 
are on the horizon”); see also SCHOENBROD, supra note 66, at 155-64 (arguing that the New Deal did 
not amend the Constitution to permit congressional delegation to agencies and that such delegation is 
unconstitutional). See generally PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014) 
(framing the modern debate on the nondelegation doctrine and contending that modern American 
administrative law is unlawful). 
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federal politics and the development of federal constitutional law. This class 
of cases involved delegations from legislators to voters. Although such cases 
were few in number, they occupied a large share of the nondelegation cases 
heard in the early decades of the nineteenth century. In the mid-nineteenth 
century, state legislators often turned to the innovative device of the 
referendum to empower local popular majorities to make such controversial 
policy decisions as whether to impose a school tax266 or prohibit the sale of 
alcohol.267 Judges were, in turn, called upon to decide whether the state 
legislature could pass the buck in this fashion. 
Despite this variety, all these cases were understood to implicate the same basic 
principle of American constitutional law—the extent to which legislatures 
could delegate power to other entities. The core concern was a consistent one of 
trying to understand what decisionmaking authority had to be retained by the 
legislature itself and what could be parceled out to others, and judges in all of 
these cases had to tread a similar path in trying to interpret the meaning and 
significance of the constitutional grant of legislative power to the legislature. 
The later judicial analysis of—and accommodation to—the legislative use of 
executive agencies built on the back of earlier analysis of—and accommodation 
to—the legislative use of voters and local governmental entities. 
Statutes delegating authority to nonlegislative actors varied not only by 
the recipient of the delegated authority but also by the type of authority being 
received. Table 3 places these nondelegation cases into four categories 
depending on the type of law at issue. It likewise organizes the data into two 
time periods, before and after 1880. Cases are distinguished by whether the 
delegated power in question primarily involves regulation, taxation, spending, 
or something else (i.e., other). 
 
Table 3: Subject Matter of Delegation 
  
Regulation 
 
Taxation 
 
Spending 
 
Other 
Before 1880 28% 34% 6% 33% 
After 1880 54% 14% 8% 25% 
χ2 statistic 52.07*** 54.30*** 0.8491 7.392** 
 ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
 
 
266 See, e.g., Steward v. Jefferson, 3 Del. (3 Harr.) 335, 336-37 (1841) (finding a state statute constitutional 
that permitted a tax to be imposed upon residents of a school district following a vote by those residents). 
267 See, e.g., Parker v. Commonwealth, 6 Pa. 507, 514-15 (1847) (holding that state legislatures could 
not constitutionally delegate to voters the power to determine whether the sale of alcohol will be legal). 
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Again, there are important points of continuity and discontinuity. Delegations 
of spending authority occupy a small but persistent share of the nondelegation 
cases across this period.268 The catch-all “other” category is quite large here, 
often capturing the delegation of authority to manipulate political structures 
themselves—such as the congressional authorization of the state executive 
council to participate in the organization of the state militia269 or legislative 
authorization of the local voters to decide whether a new township should be 
preserved or dissolved.270 
And again, two types of cases exchange places in their relative prominence 
on the docket. Cases involving the delegation of taxation authority were once 
the most notable subject matter involved in nondelegation cases. Who could 
impose taxes and financial obligations on the taxpayers (and for what 
purposes) were hot-button issues in the Jacksonian period, and courts were 
frequently asked to determine questions such as whether the legislature could 
authorize county courts to impose taxes to pay for road construction271 or 
whether the implementation of a law raising taxes for free public schools 
could be made contingent on the approval of the voters.272 Such cases, 
however, were in steady decline in the years after the Civil War, and a different 
category of cases more than filled their place. 
As Table 3 shows, by the beginning of the twentieth century, over half of 
the nondelegation cases involved legislative delegation of regulatory power. 
Of course, the rise of regulatory cases went hand-in-hand with the rise of 
cases involving executive commissions and agencies. In some instances, 
legislatures turned to more traditional executive officials, such as the U.S. 
Secretary of War, who was authorized to make any necessary rules and 
regulations to protect improvements on the Mississippi River.273 Riding 
circuit, Justice Lamar thought the crucial fact was not whether Congress had 
itself established the substance of the rules and regulations that would govern 
river traffic but that Congress “denounces the violation of it as a crime, and 
 
268 See, e.g., City of Des Moines v. Hillis, 8 N.W. 638, 641 (Iowa 1881) (holding that the state 
legislature may authorize a municipal government to set a salary for a police judge). 
269 See In re Adams, 21 Mass. (4 Pick.) 25, 29 (1826) (upholding a 1792 act of Congress allowing 
state governments to arrange militias as the legislature deemed appropriate). 
270 See Commonwealth v. Judges of Quarter Sessions, 8 Pa. 391, 395-96 (1848) (finding such 
delegation constitutional). 
271 See Justices of Clark Cty. Court v. Paris, Winchester & Ky. River Tpk. Co., 50 Ky. (11 B. 
Mon.) 143, 151-52 (1850) (finding such delegation of taxing authority constitutional). 
272 See Johnson v. Rich, 9 Barb. 680, 681-82 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1851) (finding the submission of 
a tax to referendum to be permissible), overruled by Barto v. Himrod, 8 N.Y. 483, 489-91 (1853). 
273 See United States v. Breen, 40 F. 402, 402 (C.C.E.D. La. 1889) (addressing whether such 
congressional delegation to the Secretary of War was constitutional). 
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prescribes the penalty.”274 “[C]riminality” could only “result directly and 
exclusively from the legislation of congress,” but the establishment of rules 
that might generate such criminal violations could be left to others.275 
Legislatures, however, were increasingly turning to newly created institutions, 
such as professional licensing boards. The Oregon Supreme Court, for 
example, found no difficulty with the creation of a state licensing board for 
barbers.276 The legislature had done its job in defining what constitutes a 
barber and specifying that those practicing the trade must receive a license 
from a state board. It could appropriately be left to the appointed members 
of the board of examiners to set all standards for determining who might 
qualify for a license.277 Similarly, the New Hampshire Supreme Court found 
that the legislature could leave to the state board of health the power to make 
“all necessary rules and regulations” which might advance the goal of 
preventing unhealthy conditions in food production, storage, and trade.278 
“[G]eneral statutory authority” was sufficient; everything else could be 
“referred to some designated ministerial officer or body.”279 
Since Reconstruction, nondelegation cases have largely revolved around 
the structure of the modern regulatory state, but it is important to recognize 
that such cases emerged out of—and continued alongside—a mix of other 
types of cases. The problem of nondelegation was not a unique result of the 
creation of a modern administrative bureaucracy but has been a persistent 
adjunct of the evolving challenges of governing with legislatures constituted by 
fundamental law. Federal constitutional law has been particularly concerned 
with delegation of regulatory power to executive agencies; however, within 
the development of American constitutional law, the federal courts have been 
relative latecomers and less active participants. Over the course of the 
nineteenth century, state courts were working through the principles of 
nondelegation in a more complex array of cases while federal courts were 
largely sitting on the sidelines. 
Recognizing this more complex legal environment within which the 
nondelegation doctrine developed and was applied prior to the New Deal 
places modern arguments about the nondelegation doctrine in a better 
context. The presumably robust nondelegation doctrine of the nineteenth 
century is often held as a significant obstacle to the kinds of progressive 
reforms advanced in the early twentieth century. The actual history of the 
nondelegation doctrine gives little support for that expectation. 
 
274 Id. at 404. 
275 Id. 
276 State v. Briggs, 77 P. 750, 750-51 (Or. 1904). 
277 Id. 
278 State v. Normand, 85 A. 899, 900 (N.H. 1913). 
279 Id. at 902. 
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As Figure 1 showed, the actual invalidation rate of litigated cases raising 
nondelegation challenges to legislation was generally low. Moreover, the odds of 
success became even longer as the modern regulatory state was being constructed 
and legislators experimented with such innovative tools as specialized 
regulatory commissions. Table 4 elaborates on those developments, indicating 
the rate at which the legislature lost these nondelegation challenges. 
Table 4 distinguishes between cases resolved in state courts and those 
resolved in federal courts. As indicated earlier, the state courts were by far 
the more common venue for hearing nondelegation cases.280 The invalidation 
rate in Table 4 reflects that reality, as only a handful of nondelegation cases 
were resolved by federal judges prior to 1880—and all were decided in the 
government’s favor. After 1880, the federal courts heard such cases more 
routinely as the administrative state was built and also began to rule against 
Congress. The state courts were more active in both the early and late 
nineteenth century in hearing such cases and in ruling against legislative 
efforts to delegate power. 
 
Table 4: Invalidation Rate in State and Federal Cases 
  
State Cases 
 
Federal Cases 
Total 18% 12% 
Before 1880 24% 0% 
After 1880 17% 12% 
 
While the invalidation rate in the state courts indicates a robust 
nineteenth century tradition of evaluating legislative action against accepted 
constitutional prohibitions on delegations of lawmaking power, it also suggests 
that the courts increasingly accommodated legislative innovations. As courts 
heard more nondelegation challenges in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, federal judges finally found some cases in which the 
legislature had gone too far—but even then the invalidation rate was fairly 
low. The more active state courts generated more stable patterns of behavior 
that were less susceptible to the idiosyncrasies of individual cases, but on 
average these courts were less likely to strike down statutory provisions later 
in the period. Neither the state nor the federal courts were much of an 
obstacle to the delegation of legislative power to nonlegislative actors. 
 
 
 
280 See supra notes 265–67 and accompanying text. 
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Table 5: Invalidation Rate in All Cases by Object of Delegation 
 
  
Executive 
 
Agency 
 
Judiciary 
Local 
Gov’t 
 
Voters 
 
Other 
Total 20% 13% 21% 15% 17% 29% 
Before 
1880 18% 20% 32% 24% 21% 17% 
After 
1880 20% 13% 20% 14% 15% 29% 
 
The declining willingness of even state courts to limit legislative delegations 
in part reflects the shifting composition of the nondelegation cases heard by 
the courts over time. As Table 2 indicates, delegations to executive agencies 
increased from a trivial proportion of early nineteenth-century nondelegation 
cases to a majority of the post-1880 cases. Conversely, cases delegating power 
to voters followed the opposite trajectory. Table 5 shows the invalidation rates 
across these different types of nondelegation cases. Statutes delegating power 
did not all have an equal likelihood of success when challenged in courts. The 
objects of the delegation reflect distinct invalidation rates, and those rates 
changed over time. Most notably, early delegation to executive agencies had 
always fared well in court, and such delegations were even less vulnerable to 
challenge after 1880 when such cases became extremely common. Delegations 
to executive branch actors had among the lowest invalidation rates of any type 
of statutory delegation. Far from being disfavored, as modern proponents of 
the nondelegation doctrine might suggest, courts seemed to prefer legislative 
delegations to executive actors during the classical era of nondelegation 
constitutional jurisprudence. 
 
Table 6: Invalidation Rate in All Cases by Subject Matter of Delegation 
  
Regulation 
 
Taxation 
 
Spending 
 
Other 
Total 17% 18% 24% 14% 
Before  
1880 30% 26% 9% 17% 
After  
1880 16% 16% 25% 13% 
 
Examination of delegation by subject matter demonstrates additional 
implications of nondelegation jurisprudence. Table 6 shows the invalidation 
rate of statutory provisions in nondelegation cases organized by the subject 
matter of the delegation. Table 3 shows that a majority of the cases decided 
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after 1880 involved regulatory provisions, in keeping with the growth of cases 
involving executive agencies. Table 6 indicates that cases involving regulation 
were also likely to be upheld. Moreover, the invalidation rate of regulatory 
cases declined dramatically as that type of case became more common after 
1880. As Table 6 demonstrates, courts never particularly disfavored delegations 
of regulatory authority. 
This is not to say judges never found that legislatures violated the 
nondelegation principle. The easy case for upholding statutes involved 
situations where the judge could credibly claim that the legislature had not 
simply handed over “the power to make a law” but rather had handed down 
“the power to determine a fact or thing upon which the action of the law 
depends.”281 But knowing which type of action the legislature had taken might 
turn simply on how each judge chose to characterize the case. 
Creating needful rules and regulations was a commonplace job for boards, 
commissions, and agencies, but the Iowa Supreme Court objected when the 
legislature authorized the highway commission to make any rules it deemed 
necessary for traffic safety on state roads. The court thought this was little 
better than designating the subject matter for commission action, leaving the 
legislature with nothing to do but “meet and create boards.”282 More often than 
not, however, judges were content to characterize such laws as complete in 
themselves, leaving only the details to be fleshed out by administrative agents. 
Often, the judicial objection to the delegation of power rested on the 
judicial judgment that the power was not well used. In Ohio, the court feared 
that the examiner of steam engineers was little more than an “autocrat[] with 
unlimited discretion,”283 and in Illinois, the court complained that a school 
board had mandated the vaccination of all school children when “smallpox 
did not exist in the community, and where there was no cause to apprehend 
that it was approaching the vicinity of the school, or likely to become 
prevalent there.”284 And sometimes the legislature simply overstepped the 
boundaries of what courts could tolerate. The justices of the Maine Supreme 
Court accepted creation of a commission empowered to make rules and 
regulations governing fisheries but could not stomach a further provision that 
the commission’s regulations would preempt any conflicting state statutes.285 
 
281 See State v. Thompson, 60 S.W. 1077, 1079 (Mo. 1901) (en banc) (upholding the power of 
an auditor to grant gambling licenses to applicants of “good character”). 
282 Goodlove v. Logan, 251 N.W. 39, 43 (Iowa 1933). 
283 Harmon v. State, 64 N.E. 117, 117 (Ohio 1902) (per curiam). 
284 Potts v. Breen, 47 N.E. 81, 85 (Ill. 1897). 
285 See McKenney v. Farnsworth, 118 A. 237, 238 (Me. 1922) (holding that “[t]here can be no 
controversy regarding the unconstitutionality of” a clause that delegates the power to repeal laws). 
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Accordingly, the court ruled that the legislature could not authorize a 
commission to repeal laws.286 
The judges who were deciding nondelegation cases contemporaneously 
with the growth of the modern administrative state did not seem particularly 
troubled by those developments. If anything, the courts viewed the delegation 
of broad regulatory authority to executive agencies with greater favor than 
earlier innovative delegations to judges or voters. State and federal judges 
proved willing to accommodate the new institutional devices that emerged in 
the Gilded Age and expanded in the Progressive Era. 
CONCLUSION 
In a new book on the “unchecked expansion of the state,” former Congressman 
David McIntosh complains that the courts have gutted the nondelegation 
doctrine and, in doing so, have abdicated their role of enforcing a strict 
separation of powers.287 Many conservative critics of the modern administrative 
state remain haunted by the notion that among the fatalities of the constitutional 
battles of the New Deal was a robust nondelegation doctrine that imposed 
significant restraints on the delegation of regulatory authority to agencies and 
commissions. They claim there was a golden age in which courts stood firm 
against feckless legislators who sought to pass on hard policy decisions to 
others, and there were once legal, doctrinal, and political resources for 
confining the discretion of legislatures to delegate substantive policymaking 
authority. From this perspective, a serious nondelegation doctrine is part of 
a constitution-in-exile that can and should be brought in from the cold. 
This narrative is more mythical than historical. Constitutional lawyers in 
the nineteenth century understood that the lawmaking power could not be 
delegated out of the legislative bodies to which the sovereign people had entrusted 
it. But they also thought that this constitutional commitment posed little 
obstacle to the rise of the administrative state. The creation of agencies and 
commissions filled with experts who could effectively make the regulatory 
policy that shaped the economy was no doubt innovative and required 
significant rethinking of traditional governmental forms. But state and 
federal judges did not hesitate to give their stamp of approval to those 
institutional innovations. Traditional constitutional principles were thought 
to be capacious enough to accommodate the new administrative structures. 
That the nondelegation doctrine was more bark than bite in the decades 
before the New Deal—as it has been in the decades since the New Deal—does 
 
286 Id. 
287 David McIntosh & William J. Haun, The Separation of Powers in an Administrative State, in 
LIBERTY’S NEMESIS: THE UNCHECKED EXPANSION OF THE STATE 239, 239-244 (Dean Reuter 
& John Yoo eds., 2016). 
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not in itself subvert the normative argument in favor of a more robust 
nondelegation doctrine. It may well be the case that, as a matter of logic, the 
modern administrative state is hard to square with foundational constitutional 
structures. It might be that public policy would be better if crucial decisions now 
delegated to executive agencies were instead made by legislators. Alternatively, 
representative democracy might function better if those who stand for election 
were barred from delegating controversial policy decisions to less accountable 
government officials. But advocates for such doctrinal reform should be aware 
that such a confining system of constitutional rules would be an unprecedented 
change in the American experience, not a return to an earlier governing 
framework. Judges never developed the sort of doctrinal tools that would allow 
them to meaningfully distinguish between inappropriate abdication of legislative 
power and necessary delegation of administrative details. Furthermore, courts 
never showed the political wherewithal to resist the kinds of administrative 
innovations that political actors have regarded as necessary for a functional 
modern government. 
If there was a falling away from the original constitutional design that 
allowed for the rise of the modern administrative state, it came well before 
the New Deal and the constitutional revolution of 1937—even before Woodrow 
Wilson and the Progressive attack on traditional ideas about the separation 
of powers.288 In the earliest nineteenth-century nondelegation cases, judges 
equivocated in the face of the legislative desire to make use of outside parties 
to flesh out policy directives. Judges have never doubted that there was such 
a thing as a nondelegation principle that legislatures should recognize and 
respect, but judges were hesitant to obstruct lawmakers. 
While considering the work of the United States Sentencing Commission, 
Justice Scalia lamented, “[W]hile the doctrine of unconstitutional delegation is 
unquestionably a fundamental element of our constitutional system, it is not 
an element readily enforceable by the courts.”289 The history of judicial efforts 
to articulate and apply the nondelegation doctrine would seem to support his 
assessment.290 Justice Scalia was not the first to worry that the lack of a rigorous 
nondelegation doctrine could result in the creation of a “junior-varsity 
Congress”291 that does the lawmaking work of Congress outside the 
traditional constitutional structure of separated powers. Some have claimed 
that pre–New Deal judges understood how to prevent that possibility and 
held the key to preserving the Founders’ original constitutional vision. But, 
 
288 For more discussion on the Progressive theorists of the separation of powers, see JOHN A. ROHR, 
TO RUN A CONSTITUTION: THE LEGITIMACY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 56-89 (1986). 
289 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
290 Scalia himself went on to try to identify a bright-line rule that might be enforced by the 
courts. See id. at 417. 
291 Id. at 427. 
2017] The Myth of the Nondelegation Doctrine 431 
as we have shown, the nondelegation doctrine was not a casualty of the New Deal 
revolution. Long before then, the nondelegation doctrine—the meaningful and 
judicially enforced constitutional constraint on legislatures—was already dead. 
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